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IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIC WILL 
DANIEL I. MORALES* 
The character of the American immigration regime has remained remarkably stable over 
many decades.  It changes, to be sure, sometimes granting migrants benefits and at other mo-
ments cracking down.  However, the broad trend is unmistakable: immigration law and the way it 
is implemented is increasingly harsh and inhumane.  This article argues that this long-term trend 
is likely to continue—even in the event of comprehensive immigration reform—unless the immi-
gration reform agenda reconciles itself with the structural elements responsible for this trend and 
imagines ways to counteract them. In particular I urge a reconsideration of the relationship be-
tween the immigration reform agenda and the democratic will.1 Rather than focus on finding 
ways to quash anti-migrant policies that are responsive to the democratic will, reformers should 
develop creative, democratically legitimate ways to alter the demands that citizens make. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars of the American immigration regime want it to change significantly.  Change is 
needed because the regime in its current form does not serve the needs of American citizens or 
migrants particularly well.2  This consensus is supported by a diverse array of critiques of immi-
gration law practices—past, present, and planned3—and it has produced an equally varied set of 
                                                                
*Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, B.A., Williams College.  Many thanks to, 
Richard Boswell, Jessica Clarke, Barry Kellman, Audrey Macklin, Greg Mark, Zoë Robinson, Joshua Sarnoff, Allison 
Tirres, and Deborah Tuerkheimer for helpful comments. 
 1 I use the term “democratic will” throughout this article to denote the pre-legislative political force com-
posed of citizens that legal institutions are responsive to in varying degrees.  In this formulation, and particularly in the 
immigration context, legislation is an expression of, or to some significant degree responsive to, the democratic will. 
 2 This is a robust assertion that holds true from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.  The simplest case is a 
liberal economic one.  If maximization of global economic welfare is the aim, then barriers to entry produce classic in-
stances of global dead-weight loss.  See generally Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration 
and the Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1 (2008).  These losses 
are also felt within in the United States.  See Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Alien Workers and Distributive 
Justice, (U. Pa. L. Sch., Public Law Research, Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1171943  (citing evidence that restrictions on labor migration produce a national dead-weight loss, though conceding a 
small negative distributional effect on domestic low-wage workers).  See also KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE 
FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, 137-67 (2007) (arguing that 
the economic benefit of open migration significantly exceeds the economic cost when considered from the perspective of 
the United States).  The normative political and philosophical case for liberalization of migration is also well established.  
See, e.g., JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2010); Joseph H. Carens, Al-
iens Citizens and the Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. OF POL. 251 (1987); see also Mathias Risse, On the Morality of Im-
migration, 22 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 25 (2008).  However, the normative case for treating migrants with higher regard does 
not require a fully cosmopolitan view of state obligation.  See Arash Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: 
No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders, 36 POL. THEORY 37 (2008); Meghan Benton, The Tyranny of the 
Enfranchised Majority? The Accountability of States to Their Non-Citizen Population, 16 RES PUBLICA 397, 407 (2010). 
 3 See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2004); JUAN F. PEREA, ED., IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED 
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proposals to bring the regime in line with domestic and international normative commitments.4  
But the scholarship of reform has a blind spot: it fails to adequately appreciate that the harsh char-
acter of the immigration regime is the product of a variety of entrenched legal, political, social, 
and economic forces working over time.  The problem is structural; the harshness is embedded in 
this web of forces, making it difficult to dislodge. 
Law reflects and constructs social beliefs about immigration (for instance, that “illegal” 
migrants drain public resources) and those socio-legal beliefs create political demands that drive 
the passage of more laws (such as those that bar “illegal” migrants from Medicaid).5  The conver-
sion of social beliefs into law reproduces and magnifies those social beliefs over time, making 
those beliefs durable and lasting (hence the pervasive belief that “illegal” migrants drain our re-
sources and thus do not receive Medicaid).  Because the societal attitudes towards immigrants are 
generally negative, and prior laws set a floor for harsh treatment, the expression of social animosi-
ty through law requires new laws to be more punitive than prior laws.6  For instance, newer legal 
measures bar both “illegal” and legal migrants from receiving Medicaid or food stamps.7  This 
self-perpetuating process creates a regulatory regime of escalating harshness.8  The feelings ex-
                                                                
STATES (1997); VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 
(2005); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1569 (2010); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Re-
forms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 612 (2003); Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism 
Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 35 (2007). 
 4 See, e.g., Eleanor Brown, An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to ‘Snitch’, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
973 (2012); Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies, 
27 N. C. J. OF INT’L LAW & COM. REG. 465, 469 (2002); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1710 (2010) (advocating overhaul of immigration adjudication); David A. Martin, Two Cheers for 
Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673 (2000) (advocating better enforcement practices 
as the key to building support for pro-migrant immigration policies); Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel 
in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2012) 
(suggesting that Padilla can be read to pave the doctrinal path to a right to counsel in deportation proceedings); Eleanor 
Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance (Harvard Univ. L. Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Working Pa-
per No. 08-12, 2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1131022; Stephen Legomsky, 
Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel (Wash. 
Univ. L. Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-10-04, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945831; Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, supra 
note 3, at 50 (advocating that Congress pass nonbinding resolutions that express the empirical truth that immigration does 
not have a relationship to terrorism, as a counter to the circulation of the false correlation between immigration and terror-
ism in congressional debate ); JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH,  supra note 3 (advocating the abolition of bor-
der controls); STEVENS, supra note 2 (advocating free movement of persons, among other extensive changes to legal regu-
lation as part of a comprehensive effort to create a viable set of local governments, but without the nation state). 
 5 See Tanya Broder & Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (last updated Oct. 2011), http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html. 
 6 This process of socio-legal reinforcement, which makes legal structures and choices appear natural, is a 
staple argument of the Law & Society literature. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 17-24, 37 (2010) (“The ability of law to create social realities that appear 
natural by inventing many of the categories we think with, means that it insinuates itself invisibly into our everyday 
worlds and wields extraordinary power.”). 
 7 See Broder & Blazer, supra note 5. 
 8 This process is similar to the process that has resulted in the severity of our criminal law regime.  See 
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND 
EUROPE 199-201 (2005); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 9, 13-14 (2002); Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democ-
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pressed in episodic political flare-ups continue in force long after the flare-up subsides.9 
The harshness of immigration law in the United States goes uncorrected for another 
structural reason:10 the affected migrants are not U.S. citizens.  This difference has a number of 
important implications, including that migrants cannot vote,11 and so go without formal political 
representation.  From this disenfranchisement it follows that legislative or executive actions relat-
ed to immigration lack the formal approval of many in the communities most affected by those 
actions.  Additionally, when migrants do raise their voices in political debate, their views are sig-
nificantly discounted because, as non-citizens, they are viewed as outsiders.  Lastly, courts are ar-
guably more vulnerable to criticism when they make counter-majoritarian decisions on behalf of 
non-citizens.  Because a court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry is crucial to its efficacy, 
and because non-citizens are not a part of that legitimating audience, courts are restricted in their 
ability to rescue migrants from the political process that produces the harsh immigration regime. 
How should immigration law reform respond to the systemic harshness of the immigra-
tion regime?  If reformers are dissatisfied with any or all of the structural qualities that sustain the 
character of the regime, how might those structures be changed?  I develop these questions here, 
and sketch a partial answer.  The key to moving the regime in a new direction is for immigration 
law reformers to engage the democratic will rather than fight to quash it, and to do so in ways that 
are precisely directed12 at disrupting the processes that allow the regime to continue to develop in 
a punitive direction. 
Take one example: a citizen jury—not an immigration judge—should decide the fate of 
certain long-standing resident migrants who are legally deportable.13  Involving citizens in this 
way offers distinct advantages over the typical manner that immigration reformers seeks to per-
suade the citizenry that the immigration regime ought to become more migrant-friendly.  This re-
form has three major benefits.  First, a procedure like this allows for an ongoing public discourse 
                                                                
racy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 32 (2009), reprinted 
in 30 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 547 (2010) (applying insights from James Whitman’s work to the immigration re-
gime). 
 9 See, e.g., CHERYL SHANKS, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY, 1890-1990 239 
(2001). 
 10 Other prominent structural factors include the United States’ relative power over countries that send large 
numbers of migrants to its borders, and the United States’ relatively idiosyncratic relationship to rights in general. See in-
fra Part II. 
 11 See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 94 
(2006) (discussing the universality of the consensus against non-citizen voting rights).  This exclusion from representation 
is not without powerful dissenters.  See, e.g., Abizadeh, supra note 2, and accompanying text.  See also Fan, The Immigra-
tion-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, supra note 3, at 35 (observing that unrepresented or un-
derrepresented groups are unrealistically depicted in political rhetoric, in part because of their lack of political representa-
tion).  Bosniak also notes that voting in the United States was not always restricted to citizens.  See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN 
AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 191. 
 12 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-973 (1995) 
(presenting an array of government interventions intended to produce changes in social meaning of various sorts.  The 
examples show that legal interventions seeking to change social meaning must be exquisitely sensitive to social context; 
intervenors must understand clearly how the behavior they seek to change operates in the social world and use law surgi-
cally if they are to shift the norm successfully.). 
 13 I develop this idea as a concrete policy proposal in a companion piece. See Daniel I. Morales, An Immigra-
tion Jury (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).  In the manuscript I set out procedures through which a 
twelve-citizen jury would decide whether deportable immigrants eligible for discretionary relief from deportation under 
current law, would be granted such relief, and defend this model against potential criticisms.  
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about immigration. Rather than putting off until moments of crisis the discussion about who 
should or should not be a member of our community, a legal institution like the jury procedure 
would allow the conversation to continue even when immigration is not at the fore of public con-
sciousness.  Sustaining a rigorous and concrete conversation about membership is critical because 
acting with more generosity towards people who are not citizens hinges in part on expanding the 
boundaries of our society’s moral concern. To create this expansion reformers must overcome 
deeply ingrained social intuitions, biases, and institutional structures that presently dictate who 
does or does not belong.  That kind of change cannot happen episodically. 
Second, empowering citizens to decide the fate of long-standing migrants in a legally 
regulated way makes concrete what is often a very abstract discussion.  Providing citizens cause 
to understand the realities of deportation on migrants’ lives is an important antidote to migrants’ 
lack of formal political representation.  This practice provides an alternative channel for on-the-
ground knowledge of the regime’s effects to enter into political discourse.  Lastly, a procedure 
like an immigration jury engages citizens at the ground level, where they may be susceptible to 
reconsidering prejudices in a way they are not when told to do so by advocates, like national poli-
ticians, who are often perceived as socially remote and speak in general terms.  Ideally, such ex-
posure leads to knowledge, which may lead to action.  If immigration reforms are to have a dura-
ble impact on the direction of the immigration regime, they will have to deploy legal tools in ways 
that provide a foundation for social movements to build upon from the bottom up. 
Rather than rely principally on courts to quash the democratic will—through means such 
as United States v. Arizona,14 and related suits15—or harness it every so often at moments of crisis 
(as with comprehensive immigration reform), reformers should imagine and advocate for legal 
procedures that are “little ‘d’” democratic: procedures that seek to build sustainable support for 
pro-migrant policies over time by persuading citizens that migrants are not the threat to citizens’ 
welfare that the citizenry believes them to be, or that migrants are also members of society de-
serving citizens’ moral and political concern.  The immigration jury accomplishes this, for in-
stance, by requiring citizens to take in a migrant’s story along with her faults and unlawful acts 
and decide whether she is a member or not.  This process, among other things, institutionalizes a 
civil discussion about membership norms. 
My argument for a new relationship between immigration reform and the democratic 
will proceeds in four parts.  Part I uses Justice Scalia’s oral dissent in United States v. Arizona, in 
which he criticized President Obama’s grant of discretionary relief to certain young undocument-
ed migrants, to showcase the complexity of the immigration regime.  In particular, the dissent 
highlights how marginal improvements in the character of the regime can stoke simmering anti-
immigrant resentment among a broad swath of the polity.  These reactions should not be ignored 
because they can eventually make their way into law.  Part II surveys some recent legal and 
                                                                
 14 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). This was the case challenging Arizona Senate Bill 1070, a law enacted in 2010 that 
created policies that broadened the state’s abilities to enforce immigration laws within the state.  The Supreme Court nulli-
fied three sections of the law, which “were sections making it a crime to be in Arizona without legal papers, making it a 
crime to apply for or get a job in the state, or allowing police to arrest individuals who had committed crimes that could 
lead to their deportation.” Case Files: Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
cases/arizona-v-united-states/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
 15 A coalition of organizations that includes the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund con-
tinues to oppose the implementation the Arizona Law at issue in Arizona.  See, e.g., Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 
F.Supp.2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (showing that plaintiff’s representation includes attorneys from organizations like the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the National Immigration Law Center, and the Asian American 
Justice Center). 
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scholarly evidence that describes how the immigration regime perpetuates its harsh character over 
time.  This analysis clarifies that the views of the citizenry about immigration compose the struc-
tural force most amenable to change because those views are potentially malleable and have polit-
ical power.  Part III develops and defends the claim that changing what citizens “know” about 
immigration is the key to moving the regime, discussing what role law ought to play in that pro-
cess, and describing the forces that currently shape what citizens know about immigration.  Part 
IV provides some guidance to reformers who are persuaded that the relationship between immi-
gration reform and the democratic will should be reconsidered.  In particular, I discuss some theo-
retical tools that might be used to help change what citizens know about immigration, and de-
scribe where application of such tools would be most effective at altering the trajectory of the 
regime. 
Many, perhaps most, immigration scholars are convinced that allowing for more porous 
borders and more solicitous, citizen-like, treatment of migrants is in the best interest of all stake-
holders and conforms to utilitarian norms like global economic welfare maximization, as well as 
headier norms like justice.16  However, these scholars’ vision of change can become real only if 
the citizens of rich democracies are convinced of its merit.  Persuasion in democratic societies 
happens through public discourse, and public discourse about immigration in the United States is 
remarkably deficient.  Simple fiat, force-of-logic, Constitutional Law,17 or international human 
rights principles cannot force this conversation to grow or channel it in a particular direction.18  
Moreover, political discourse about a group, like migrants, that is not a formal part of the polity 
requires careful and precise mechanisms for adequately representing the views and needs of such 
outsiders.  Without those kinds of reforms the harsh, multi-decade trend in the immigration re-
gime is likely to continue. 
 
I. THE ENTRENCHED IMMIGRATION REGIME AND THE DEMOCRATIC WILL: 
SYMPTOMS 
A. The Shape of the Entrenched Immigration Regime 
Advocates of migrants’ rights or of immigration reform have recently witnessed two im-
portant victories in the United States.  The Supreme Court largely overturned a law passed by the 
State of Arizona entitled Senate Bill 1070 (“S.B. 1070”) which sought to enact a state-directed 
                                                                
 16 See Howard Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the Liberalized Move-
ment of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 373 (1998-99). 
 17 See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the 
United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/Abs 
ByAuth.cfm?per_id=1551898 (tracing the decline of rights-based arguments as an effective legal strategy for securing 
better treatment of migrants  and arguing that the decline “might reflect a decreased willingness to recognize non-citizens 
as members of civil society”). 
 18 See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 
COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999) (skeptically examining the use of international human rights norms to bolster pro-migrant ar-
guments, and noting that a problematic feature of international human rights arguments is that they eclipse the interests of 
citizens).  See also Paul W. Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141, 152 
(2001) (articulating that rights in the United States are in an important sense subordinate to the democratic will); Morales, 
In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 51-53 (describing the internal logic of domestic American and international law 
that prevents the robust expression of human rights against the democratic will). 
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immigration enforcement policy labeled “attrition through enforcement.”19  The intent of the law 
was to enforce federal and state law in a way that made Arizona a very unpleasant place to be an 
undocumented immigrant.20  Significantly, the Supreme Court’s action potentially affects a wide 
swath of states that had passed laws copying S.B. 1070.21 
A few weeks before the Supreme Court ruled in Arizona, President Barack Obama 
agreed to grant a form of executive relief from prosecution for immigration violations, called de-
ferred action, to a group of young, educated immigrants, commonly referred to as DREAMers.22  
The executive action was designed to grant this most sympathetic group of “illegal” immigrants 
the ability to remain in the United States unperturbed by the threat of deportation. 
These victories will improve the lot of migrants to some degree, but they may also pro-
duce political conditions that will ultimately further the harsh trajectory of the regime.  We might 
initially be inclined to think of the President’s grant of deferred action and the decision in Arizona 
as wins for migrants’ rights. However, a closer examination reveals the harsh immigration regime 
reconstituting itself in response to such legal victories.  Because majoritarian sentiments largely 
remain anti-”illegal” immigrant,23 those sentiments—aided by the exclusion of migrants from 
electoral politics—may eventually create policies that push back against such pro-migrant legal 
victories, via the other structural forces operating in the regime.  This sets the stage for the next 
ratchet in immigration harshness to be achieved.24  The anecdote and analysis that follow illustrate 
                                                                
 19 S.B. 1070 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 20 For example the still-valid “show-me-you-papers” provisions mandate immigration status checks pursuant 
to lawful police stops, detentions or arrests where “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully 
present in the United States.” See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2515 (citing S.B. 1070 § 2(B)). 
 21 Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah passed laws regulating undocumented migration that 
are similar to S.B. 1070. See Lawrence Downes, When States Put Out the Unwelcome Mat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at 
SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/when-states-put-out-the-unwelcome-mat.html. 
 22 DREAMers are the intended beneficiaries of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, 
a version of which is currently pending in the House and the Senate. See DREAM Act of 2011, H.R.1842, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (referred to H. Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, June 1, 2011); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 
112th Cong. (2011) (referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security, 
June 28, 2011).  The DREAM Act would authorize the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to grant lawful 
permanent resident status to an undocumented immigrant who “(1) entered the United States on or before his or her 15th 
birthday and has been present in the United States for at least five years immediately preceding this Act’s enactment, (2) is 
a person of good moral character, (3) is not inadmissible under specified grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
(4) has been admitted to an institution of higher education (IHE) in the United States or has earned a high school diploma 
or general education development certificate in the United States, and (5) was age 32 or younger on the date of this Act’s 
enactment.”  H.R.1842 § 3. 
 23 See infra note 194 (discussing the disfavorable disposition of Americans to immigrants who entered unlaw-
fully). 
 24 The prospect of the passage of comprehensive immigration reform that grants amnesty to the millions of 
migrants who lack legal status does not radically alter this analysis.  Note that the possibility of granting any relief to mi-
grants is a consequence of the years of record-level deportations under the administrations of George W. Bush and Presi-
dent Obama.  See Alan Gomez, Obama Administration Sets Deportation Record: 409,849 USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2012, 
5:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/21/record-2012-deportations/1785725/ (noting that “[f]or 
the fourth year in a row, the Obama administration has set a record for the number of people it deported.”  As of the press 
date the administration had deported 409,849 people in the year 2012 alone.); Molly O’Toole, Analysis: Obama Deporta-
tions Raise Immigration Policy Questions, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
09/20/us-obama-immigration -idUSTRE78J05720110920 (documenting that the Obama administration has “deported 
about 1.06 million [people] as of September 12, [2011], against 1.57 million in [President George W.] Bush’s two full 
presidential terms). 
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these points. 
On May 28, 2012, more than ninety immigration law professors (including this author) 
sent a letter to President Obama spelling out his authority to grant administrative relief to poten-
tial beneficiaries of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors “DREAM” Act that 
was then stalled in Congress.25  The letter took no position “on the policy dimensions of a deci-
sion to exercise or to not exercise this authority,”26 instead simply listing the multiple legal bases 
by which the President might do so if he chose.  Choose he did.  Two weeks later, in the White 
House Rose Garden, the President announced that exercising this authority was “the right thing to 
do.”27  Speaking of the undocumented persons who would benefit, the President emphasized 
“[t]hey are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on paper,” and 
that granting relief to these de facto citizens is in the interests of the whole country “because these 
young people are going to make extraordinary contributions, and are already making extraordi-
nary contributions, to our society.”28 
The Rose Garden speech made another appearance on June 25, 2012 when Justice Scalia 
quoted from it disapprovingly in the bench statement he delivered prior to issuing his written dis-
sent in Arizona v. United States.29  Justice Scalia stated that the President may believe that 
exempting 1.4 million illegal immigrants [from prosecution] . . . is ‘the right 
thing to do’ in light of Congress’s failure to pass the Administration’s immigra-
                                                                
Additionally, any reform package will reaffirm the enforcement-first approach that the record deportation levels reflect.  
See Mark Lander, Obama Hails Bipartisan Plan to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/us/politics/obama-issues-call-for-immigration-overhaul.html?hp.  Both the Obama 
administration’s framework for immigration reform and that of the bipartisan group of senators includes more border en-
forcement, increased employer enforcement, along with temporary worker visas, an amnesty and other provisions.  See 
Ashley Parker, Senators Call Their Bipartisan Immigration Plan a ‘Breakthrough,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/us/politics/senators-unveil-bipartisan-immigration-principles.html. Office of the 
Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Fixing our Broken Immigration System so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013),  
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-
everyone-plays-rules [hereinafter Fact Sheet].  This enforcement-first approach reinforces the negative social perception 
of immigrants, and that perception contributes to the broadly unforgiving character of the regime: the enforcement appa-
ratus signals strongly that unlawful migration is morally reprehensible.  See infra Part II.B. (discussing the phenomenon of 
an “enforcement feedback loop”); Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 151.  Enacting comprehensive im-
migration reform in the manner that is politically palatable at present would contribute to the structural dynamic that I ar-
gue works to maintain the harsh character of the regime over the long run.  This dynamic must be disrupted through dem-
ocratic channels, if the longer-term goals of the most ambitious immigration reformers, such as the free-movement of 
persons, are ever to be achieved. 
 25 Letter from various law professors to President Barack Obama (May 28, 2012) (regarding Executive Au-
thority to Grant Administrative Relief for DREAM Act Beneficiaries), available at http://nilc.org/document.html?id=754. 
 26 Id. 
 27 President Barack Obama, Remarks on Immigration (June 15, 2012) (transcript available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Bench Statement of Justice Scalia at 5, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (June 25, 
2012), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/.  I agree with Lani Guinier that 
oral dissents like Scalia’s have a “distinctive potential to root disagreement about the meaning and interpretation of consti-
tutional law in a more democratically accountable soil.  [ . . . ]  [And thereby] spark a deliberative process that [. . .] [pro-
duces an] ongoing dialogue between constitutional law and constitutional culture.”  Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 
2007 Term Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2008-2009). 
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tion laws . . . though Arizona might not think so.  But to say, as the court does, 
that Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing applications of federal immi-
gration law that the president declines to enforce boggles the mind.30 
A modified version of these statements was included in the text of the dissent.31 
Surprising as it was for Justice Scalia to invoke an executive action implemented after 
the conclusion of oral argument,32 the move effectively channeled the furor of citizens who disa-
gree with the President.  An early sign of the potential breadth of this boiled-over anger came as 
the Rose Garden announcement unfolded, when Neil Munro, a reporter for the conservative news 
website The Daily Caller, interrupted the President repeatedly during his speech to ask “what 
about American workers who are unemployed while you import foreigners?”33  The President did 
not respond—though Justice Scalia eventually did.  At the close of his written dissent, the Justice 
noted that thanks to the President’s administrative reprieve “[t]housands of Arizona’s estimated 
400,000 illegal immigrants . . . will be able to compete openly with Arizona citizens for employ-
ment.”34 
After the dissent was issued, Richard Posner criticized Justice Scalia35 for acting intem-
perately in a politically-charged case and for failing to cite any empirical support for his conten-
tion that “Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration problem.  Its citizens feel 
themselves under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain 
their social services, and even place their lives in jeopardy.”36  Posner correctly notes that each of 
these claims run against the consensus view of empirical social scientists,37 but misses something 
                                                                
 30 Justice Antonin Scalia, Bench Statement from Arizona v. United States (June 25, 2012), http:// 
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/. 
 31 Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on remarks made by 
the President on immigration). 
 32 See David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 46, (2012) (“The majority never men-
tions that DHS policy directly, but Justice Scalia excoriated it, both in his dissent and in the oral summary that he read 
from the bench on the morning the decision was handed down.”). 
 33 President Obama, Remarks on Immigration, supra note 28; Brian Stetler, Reporter Interrupts Obama’s 
Statement, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A16, available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/reporter-
interrupts- obama-during-statement-on-immigration/?ref=us. 
 34 Arizona, No. 11-182, slip op. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 35 Richard A. Posner, Supreme Court Year in Review: Justice Scalia is Upset about Illegal Immigration.  But 
Where is His Evidence?, SLATE.COM (June 27, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
the_breakfast_table/features/2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review/supreme_court_year_in_review_justice_scalia_offers_
no_evidence_to_back_up_his_claims_about_illegal_immigration_.html. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Posner wrote: 
There are 10 million to 11 million illegal immigrants (for rather obvious reasons no one knows the 
exact number), and illegal immigrants are thought to amount to about 5 percent of the total labor 
force.  Because they tend to do jobs that few Americans want, and because their wages are below 
average, many (though by no means all) economists believe that the illegal immigrants actually in-
crease the wages of Americans (including legal immigrants).  The reason is that the existence of a 
large body of low-wage workers increases the demand for goods and services both by reducing the 
cost of production and by their own purchases as consumers, and increased demand for goods and 
services translates into increased demand for labor and hence higher wages.  This is not a certainty 
but seems a good guess of the effect of illegal immigrants.  Illegal immigrants do receive some so-
cial services, but fewer than citizens do.  It is unclear whether they commit more crimes on average 
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essential: the Justice wrote that Arizonans “feel”38 that these effects of undocumented migration 
are real—not that they actually are real.  Feelings are subjective; they have a reality irrespective of 
their grounding in objective fact.  This word choice, in the context of a dissent that elaborated a 
robust scope for Arizona’s sovereign power, permits another interpretation of Justice Scalia’s ar-
gument.  Scalia does not need empirical evidence of migrants’ effects on the state economy be-
cause the people of Arizona have spoken through the law.  Whether Arizonans’ beliefs are defini-
tively true is beside the point because the democratic process is itself an authoritative source of 
migrants’ effects.  The implication of Scalia’s point is that Arizonans, as popular sovereigns of a 
sovereign state, may act legitimately against non-citizens based on their feelings about social con-
ditions, even if those feelings do not align with external and objective fact.39 
Justice Scalia is correct on this point, and the majority acts in part on this belief as well.  
Not only did the majority choose40 to allow Arizona to move forward with the portion of the law 
that was most critical to implementing Arizona’s immigration policy of “attrition through en-
forcement,” even though a credible doctrinal basis for striking down that provision was availa-
ble,41 but it also lent further doctrinal support to Congress’ plenary authority over immigration 
law.  While in this particular case the effect of reinforcing plenary authority is relatively pro-
migrant, considered in total, plenary authority grants a huge degree of latitude to a governmental 
apparatus that is many orders of magnitude more powerful than the state of Arizona. 
Note, too, that the federal law that Arizona held largely to supersede S.B. 1070 was built 
of the same psychic stuff as that local bill;42 the United States Congress is not immune to passing 
                                                                
than citizens; they may commit fewer.  Of course, some illegal immigrants are criminals, and the 
Obama administration has decided to focus the very limited resources of the federal immigration en-
forcement authorities on catching and deporting the criminals.  Focusing on them and leaving the 
law-abiding (law-abiding except for the immigration law itself!) illegal immigrants seems a defen-
sible policy.  And certainly state and local law enforcement can assist the feds in apprehending ille-
gal immigrants who commit crimes (being in this country without legal authorization is unlawful, 
but, with some exceptions, it is not criminal); nothing in the Arizona decision prevents that. 
Posner, supra note 35 (referring to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v. United States). The reality of criminal incidence in 
Arizona is much better than Posner lets on.  Over the same period that immigration significantly increased in Arizona the 
incidence of property and violent crime actually decreased at a rate higher than the national average.  See Mary D. Fan, 
Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-”Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination 
Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 927-29 (2011) (discussing Arizona’s above average crime rate decline over the period 
of increased undocumented migration); Tim Wadsworth, Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment 
of the Influence of Immigration on Changes in Violent Crime Between 1990 and 2000, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 531, 532-33, 548-
49 (2010); see also Matthew T. Lee & Ramiro Martinez Jr., Immigration Reduces Crime: An Emerging Scholarly Consen-
sus, in IMMIGRATION, CRIME AND JUSTICE 3-16 (William F. McDonald ed., 2010). 
 38 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2522 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39 See id. at 2511-22; for discussion, see generally Martin, Reading Arizona, supra note 32. 
 40 You need not ascribe to the view that law is indeterminate to concede that the Supreme Court had the lee-
way to rule differently on the show-me-your-papers provision.  After all, two respected Ninth Circuit judges found that 
portion of the Arizona law unconstitutional.  See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 348-54 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that the show-me-your-papers provision violates obstacle preemption principles). 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, WM. & MARY L. REV. 30-33 (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084397 (describing how the anti-immigrant animus that lead to the passage of California Propo-
sition 187 shaped the federal Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 
which adopted the cooperative state enforcement arrangements that the Arizona majority found did not preempt the show-
me your-papers provision of S.B. 1070). 
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objectionable immigration legislation in response to inflamed feelings.  Moreover, Arizona’s ma-
jority is effectively inviting Arizonans to take their feelings of being under siege to the state legis-
lature—and they are likely to.  As Rick Su has recently demonstrated, this sort of reactionary leg-
islating is exactly what has happened in the past.43  The translation of local concerns into federal 
immigration law is a feature of immigration law’s entrenchment.  Federal immigration law is not 
an autonomous and rational construction governed by a national interest; it instead reflects the ag-
gregation of the views of Arizona and other like-minded states, tempered somewhat by the rela-
tively pro-migrant positions of representatives from urban areas.44  Nothing in the Arizona majori-
ty will prevent the feelings Scalia identifies from seeping into federal law eventually. 
If Scalia is right about the Arizona zeitgeist, then we can spot a serious socio-political 
flaw in the majority opinion, which eviscerates a legal product of anxiety with a formal fact of 
constitutional structure.45  The Arizona majority answered fears of being besieged with the psy-
chically empty invocation of superior legal authority, i.e., the supremacy clause and the derivative 
doctrines of federal preemption.46  Justice Kennedy closed his opinion for the majority by stating, 
“Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration 
while that process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.”47  
By using this doctrinal ground and rhetorical strategy, the majority implicitly told a political 
movement motivated by anxiety and fear to take its frustrations to a higher legislative body, but 
extended the invitation without challenging the motives of Arizonans or contesting the empirical 
basis for their beliefs.  Arizonans, then, were invited to make their uncontested feelings into fed-
eral law, and given a sense of grievance from their overall loss before the court that could impel 
them to do so.  The failure to take on the animus motivating Arizona’s actions is particularly trou-
bling because the part of the law that most directly intrudes on migrants’ lives remains in effect.  
This key provision—the show-me-your-papers requirement48—allows the policy of attrition 
through enforcement intended by S.B. 1070 to remain operable.  Despite Justice Kennedy’s 
recognition that a deficient political discourse is at the root of why such laws are passed, his opin-
ion for the majority does little to steer that discourse in a more productive direction.49 
But the socio-political impact of this decision was, in some important way, pre-
determined.  Scalia’s dissent gets at something essentially true about the status of the people’s 
will in our particular constitutional culture.  We can read Scalia’s nostalgic vision50 of Arizona as 
                                                                
 43 Id. 
 44 See Su, supra note 42, at 44-47. 
 45 Given the posture of the case—a facial challenge to an unimplemented law—it is not clear that the Court 
had much doctrinal flexibility on this point. 
 46 See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2500-01 (Kennedy, J., writing for the majority). 
 47 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Mary Fan has argued that these kinds of arguments con-
stitute post-racial proxies that courts use in a “post-racial era to dance around race” in ways that are destructive—that in-
flame or tolerate racialized sentiment—or constructive, by mitigating “polarization by making shared interests and social 
cohesiveness salient.”  Fan, Post-Racial Proxies, supra note 37, at 905. 
 48 Section 2(b) of Arizona S.B. 1070 mandates that immigration status be checked during any lawful Fourth 
Amendment stop by police.  The majority in Arizona permitted that provision to go into effect.  See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 
2510. 
 49 Id.  For some time, scholars and commentators have noted the degree to which the discourse of immigration 
diverges from the facts on the ground.  See, e.g., Fan, The Immigration Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mis-
take, supra note 3, at 52 (citing then President George W. Bush’s call on Congress to “make sure [immigration] rhetoric is 
in accord with our traditions”). 
 50 The bulk of Scalia’s dissent resurrects the vision of territorial sovereign power that the Supreme Court en-
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a sovereign territory in the law-of-nations sense as expressing more than a dry interpretative con-
viction about originalism or the virtues of federalism; it is also a statement about the legitimate 
reach of the democratic will.  The sovereign state, Arizona, is entitled to assuage feelings of the 
majority of its citizens by seriously impinging on the lives of human beings in Arizona who are 
not citizens, or who share a common ethnicity with those who are not citizens.  Put in theoretical 
terms, the democratic sovereign is entitled to the rights of the sovereign archetype: the king who 
serves by divine authority.51  The Arizona majority does not strongly dispute this sovereign dis-
cretion, it just points to the authority of a different democratic sovereign, leaving intact the core 
logic of plenary power over immigration law and policy.  The reach of the democratic will is un-
bounded, but only if it is expressed in the proper forum (or level).  Even migrants’ ostensible vic-
tory in Arizona thus sets the stage for the provision of federal legislative action that will be ac-
corded a still-greater degree of deference by the Supreme Court. 
The effects of the President’s action mirrored the effects of the Arizona majority opinion 
in important ways.  With a lack of political consensus in Congress to grant legal status to young 
and educated undocumented immigrants, the President did grant such status, at least provisional-
ly, on his own authority.  President Obama is democratically accountable for invoking this power, 
of course, yet it was arguably exercised in this election cycle because it had the potential to win 
the votes of Latinos while leaving undisturbed the votes of others, whether or not they agreed 
with the decision to grant relief.  This invocation of executive authority does not reflect democrat-
ic sentiment as well as legislation would.  Furthermore, the extension of this reprieve to undocu-
mented children through executive order does relatively little to challenge the beliefs expressed 
by the pushy—and emblematic—conservative reporter in the Rose Garden, to whom Justice Scal-
ia gave voice in his dissent.  The relief, ironically, may thus build political support in the long run 
for more immigration restrictions and hasher treatment of migrants. 
The process of conferring relief on migrants fails to adequately address, resolve, or dissi-
pate broad and simmering resentments among significant segments of the polity who believe 
these migrants to be undeserving of the nation’s regard.  Indeed, relief often helps stoke such re-
sentments; Justice Scalia’s mind surely boggled in synchrony with a wide swath of the electorate 
who, as he accurately described it, feel themselves under siege.52 These resentments are legiti-
mized when they are subsequently democratically incorporated into legislation.  Judicial defer-
ence to the legislation produced by these sentiments is one example of the great respect paid to 
                                                                
acted in the long-since superseded case of Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).  However, that vision of 
despotic territorial authority still prevails to a significant degree in immigration law in the form of the Plenary Power doc-
trine.  For a review of the Plenary Power Doctrine see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Ple-
nary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (citing and critiquing the key cases out of which the doctrine devel-
oped). 
 51 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1995) (1977) (arguing, among other things, that the dramatically excessive punishment practices of early-modern Europe 
bolstered the idea of the sovereign’s omnipotence). 
 52 Justice Scalia’s dissent can be viewed as a reflection of broad political opinion.  Paul Kahn defends the 
methodology of treating judicial texts as reflective and productive of broader sociological currents by pointing out that 
[s]tudying the Justices is not the legal equivalent of studying the string theorists in the physics de-
partment.  There are deep resonances between what the judges and professors say, on the one hand, 
and some very basic beliefs central to a broadly available American culture of the rule of law, on the 
other.  We find the elements of this set of beliefs in much of our public rhetoric, regularly deployed 
for over 200 years. 
Kahn, supra note 18, at 152. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
MORALES FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2013  12:22 PM 
60 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 16 
the democratic will in our legal system.  This deference and the way it plays out in law, politics, 
and society should not be ignored by reformers, but often is. 
Scholars question the legitimacy of the democratic will as it pertains to immigration, fol-
lowing in the footsteps of civil rights litigators by urging that judges should not accord perceived 
majority opinion too much weight because it is likely to infringe on minority rights.  Courts are 
then asked to quash expressions of majority rule in order to recognize domestic or international 
rights that migrants, who are un- or underrepresented by the majority, are thought to bear.  How-
ever, courts and scholars regularly treat the general polity’s tendency toward nativism (the con-
ception of the existing citizenry as different from, superior to, and closed to outsiders) as natural 
and ineluctable in an effort to justify those counter-majoritarian actions.53 This occurs despite the 
fact that nativism, a socio-legal construction, can change or be overcome.54 
Treating nativism as fixed and the democratic will as something that needs to be stifled is 
the wrong way to change the trajectory of the immigration regime.  The primacy of the democrat-
ic will over the rights of migrants should largely be treated as an unchangeable fact.  Though so-
cially constructed, it is so entrenched in our legal culture and so benefits from robust normative 
support that it must be worked around, not against.  Conversely, nativism or the related feelings of 
siege that Justice Scalia describes in his dissent are socio-legal constructions that are changeable 
and should be challenged.  The reverse approach has denigrated the power of law in this area.  
American courts are unlikely ever to be the counter-majoritarian force that human rights advo-
cates would want,55 but courts’ failure to be the consistent standard-bearers for migrants’ rights 
does not mean that law is unable to make change here.  Law is deeply implicated in the construc-
tion of migrants’ denigration.  For instance, the Hart-Celler Act was a single legislative act56 that 
                                                                
 53 See generally Fan, Post-Racial Proxies, supra note 37.  Though Fan is attuned to the plasticity of nativism, 
particularly the way in which it has taken on different forms and acted on different groups through American history, and 
urges that courts can play some role in mitigating the salience of the nativist framework in political debates about immi-
gration, even her sensitive account suggests the ineluctability of nativist surges in multi-racial societies.  Her reliance on 
Carl Schmitt’s political theory, which centers political life on “the fundamental distinction . . . [between] friend and ene-
my” underscores this point. Id. at 910.  See also Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, 
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI- IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 165, 171 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (“The terminology [of ‘illegal aliens’ in the Southwest, which 
does not identify immigrant nationality,] better masks nativist sympathies than the popular vernacular that it replaced—
’wetbacks’—which is even more closely linked to Mexican immigrants”). 
 Following Roberto Unger and Jacqueline Stevens, I treat social, legal and political arrangements as having a 
high degree of plasticity, though I acknowledge, extending the metaphor, that society is a plastic with a high tolerance for 
heat and pressure. See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND 138, 193 (2007) 
(suggesting that society can be and is rearranged through the course of history); STEVENS, supra note 2 (advancing theo-
ries for the reorganization of society to prevent violent conflict by dissolving birthright citizenship, among other thought 
experiments). 
 54 See generally Lessig, supra note 12 (offering a taxonomy of methods by which state action can alter social 
meaning). 
 55 The situation may be different in Europe, for instance, where the traditions of administrative state authority 
and “the leveling up” of privileged treatment once reserved for the aristocracy have allowed for criminal punishment prac-
tices to take root that are more consistent with human dignity and human rights.  This “sociology of dignity” means that 
rights creation by non-majoritarian institutions has a more robust legitimacy in Europe than the United States, despite Eu-
ropeans’ and Americans’ shared desire for strict punishment of criminality. James Q. Whitman, ‘Human Dignity’ in Eu-
rope and the United States: The Social Foundations, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 108 (Georg Nolte ed., 
2004); See also Kahn, supra note 18, at 156-57. 
 56 See Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol16/iss1/4
MORALES FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2013  12:22 PM 
2013] IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIC WILL 61 
rendered a group of persons “illegal.”  While it may be dispiriting that law is used as a tool for 
negative social construction, it suggests that the popular sentiment that supports the regime may 
be much more plastic than scholars usually imagine.  To the extent law has constructed nativism, 
then, law may be able to undo it. 
The difficulty of this social, legal, and political revision should not be understated.  Un-
doing social meanings is difficult because once they are constructed, through law or other means, 
they tend to be robust and self-sustaining.57  Still, greater challenges have been met.58  The key is 
to think creatively, strategically, and surgically, about how law can facilitate the disruption of 
processes that produce the immigration regime’s entrenchment.  As I will argue in detail in the 
sections that follow, legal processes can create conditions that challenge citizens’ existing beliefs 
about migrants, while reaffirming the superiority of citizens’ claims to belonging over migrants’.  
Designing these kinds of legal interactions has the potential to produce a discourse that can 
change the trajectory of the regime in the long-run. 
B. Problematic Prescriptions: Ignoring the Democratic Will in the Immigration Reform 
Literature 
The immigration reform literature has paid insufficient attention to the way that law’s in-
teraction with social and political processes constructs a perception of siege among the citizenry 
that in turn creates demand for harsher laws.  This neglect is surprising, since the dynamic be-
tween law and social processes accounts significantly for the progressive hardening of American 
immigration law59 over the last three decades, as exemplified by the ever-expanding list of crimi-
nal offenses that render a noncitizen deportable, the race-based targeting of individuals for immi-
gration enforcement, the conflation of immigration and terrorism,60 and the substantial narrowing 
of avenues for administrative relief.  While Scalia and his fellows might fall at the extreme end of 
the spectrum of views on immigration law, the fact that the regime has become consistently less 
generous and inhumane over time shows that the nativist position exerts a strong influence on the 
character of the regime.  Scholarly neglect of the interaction between law and society must be 
remedied because social movements cannot do the heavy lifting alone; they need law to aid the 
process of change.  But the peculiar status of migrants in the polity demands creative ways for 
law’s power to be harnessed towards this aim. 
This descriptive gap sustains a normative sclerosis that is evident in scholars’ contribu-
tions to two loosely related kinds of efforts.  The first is due-process-focused, building out of the 
United States’ strong commitment to due process for persons—as opposed to citizens exclusive-
ly—to urge even-handed enforcement practices, more adjudicative immigration resources, or bet-
                                                                
8 U.S.C.).  The Act equalized racially discriminatory quotas but at the cost of limiting legal routes for seasonal migration 
from South and Central America.  For an extended discussion on the Hart-Celler Act, see MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE 
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 263 (2006). 
 57 See Lessig, supra note 12, at 998. 
 58 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 2, at 22-25 (discussing how the entrenched institution of slavery was over-
come, not as a result of economic factors primarily, but through social movements and changed moral norms). 
 59 See, e.g, Miller, supra note 3, at 611 (noting the increasing criminalization of immigrants under immigra-
tion law); Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 
Conn. L. Rev. 1827 (2007) (discussing the dissolution of borders between immigration law and criminal law, especially 
after September 11, 2001). 
 60 See Fan, The Immigration Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, supra note 3, at 33, 37 
(discussing the deliberate juxtaposition in congressional debates of undocumented immigration with terrorism). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
MORALES FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2013  12:22 PM 
62 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 16 
ter representation for migrants in legal proceedings.61  The second effort articulates bases upon 
which immigrants should be entitled—by virtue of political or legal norms—to the American pub-
lic’s munificence or regard.62  This agenda usually urges that membership norms be made more 
expansive or elastic.  Many scholars who contribute to furthering this normative agenda believe 
that open borders would lead to the most just immigration regime and a large number of those 
who do not agree still concur that global and domestic welfare would be enhanced by a significant 
degree of liberalization.63 
The trouble with the due process effort is that it advocates the expenditure of the highly 
limited political capital of non-citizens on reforms that will have little to no effect on substantive 
law.  Having a lawyer represent you in deportation proceedings will not help you to stay in the 
country if the substantive law provides no avenues for relief.  The membership effort, for its part, 
has persuasively articulated the philosophical, moral, and legal grounds for expanded member-
ship, but has not provided a roadmap for how to get there.  Political theorist Jacqueline Stevens 
has similarly observed that those immersed in the related literature of cosmopolitanism fail to 
“contemplat[e] the institutional steps necessary . . . for their [universalist] aspirations to be real-
ized.”64  Likewise the membership effort is philosophically persuasive, but has no sustained or 
even consistently sporadic political traction; when the membership effort meets the structural 
forces that make up the immigration regime, it withers.65 
One way to bridge these gaps may be to merge the due process reform and membership 
efforts into one.  For example, having citizens act as jurors to decide whether to grant long-
standing relief from deportation synthesizes the membership and due-process efforts by leverag-
ing the more strongly rooted and less contested commitment to due process (Padilla v. Ken-
tucky,66 which granted a process right, did not cause the public stir that Arizona did)67 to create the 
conditions that could pave the way for the membership effort to become politically feasible.  Citi-
                                                                
 61 See supra notes 2-3, and accompanying text. 
 62 For examples of scholarship illustrating this second effort, see Abizadeh, supra note 2; JOHNSON, OPENING 
THE FLOODGATES, supra note 2; Kanstroom, supra note 4; Heeren, supra note 17. 
 63 For an extensive discussion of these scholars, see generally BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra 
note 11. 
 64 STEVENS, supra note 2, at 74. 
 65 Again, the passage of comprehensive immigration reform granting a path to citizenship to most undocu-
mented immigrants does not alter this logic.  President Obama, the actor most committed to making undocumented people 
citizens, has framed the path to citizenship for undocumented migrants as a function of administrative convenience.  The 
Obama Administration press release making the case for citizenship states, “It is just not practical to deport 11 million 
undocumented immigrants living within our borders.” Fact Sheet, supra note 24.  Not only is the necessity of citizenship 
framed in a way that provides little sustained normative basis for treating migrants with more dignity and care in the long 
run, other aspects of the comprehensive reform package Obama offers reassert the longstanding emphasis on border en-
forcement, and the increased recent emphasis on restriction within the interior.  This kind of logic must be displaced en-
tirely if the more radical versions of the membership project are ever to be realized. See generally, JOHNSON, OPENING 
THE FLOODGATES, supra note 2; STEVENS, supra note 2. 
 66 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 67 The media was largely silent in the wake of the decision, particularly in comparison with the extensive cov-
erage in the aftermath of the Arizona decision.  See, THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, MEDIA ANALYSIS: COVERAGE OF 
ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES, A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARIZONA’S SB 1070 (May 2012), available at 
http://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/az_us_media_may_2012.pdf (analyzing the extensive media coverage of the 
Arizona decision); see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Splits Immigration Law Verdicts; Upholds Hotly Debated Centerpiece,  
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-rejects-part-of-
arizona-immigration-law.html?pagewanted=all. 
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zens decide whether an “illegal” migrant who paid taxes, has citizen children, and worked hard 
for many years in the United States should be permitted to remain here, despite unlawful status.  
In this process, citizens’ initial views about migrants as a category can be challenged.  The deci-
sion also creates an institutional site from which migrants can seek to contest membership norms 
through social movements.  This kind of reform works with the democratic will to build support 
for a more generous conception of who belongs in our political community. 
Why have scholars failed to see the potential for such a merger before?  Why are the 
long-term limitations of the usual approaches to reform neglected?  Perhaps because immigration 
law scholars are immersed in our adversarial legal culture.  Scholars who do normative work in 
this area usually do so because they are persuaded that justice demands more regard for migrants 
in the legal system.  While this normative perspective has an objective grounding, as much as any 
normative view can, the advocate’s mantle still exerts a hold, even for those who adhere to studi-
ous scholarly neutrality.  And that mantle often blinds scholars to the hard political reality that 
migrants are not citizens—even though most scholars agree that the distinction between the two 
ought to matter.  Still, the blindness to these key facts causes scholars to forget that the consent of 
those who benefit from the existing system is required—absent armed revolutions—to instigate 
pro-migrant changes to the regime.  In the United States this means that loosening border en-
forcement or devoting more resources to immigration hinges on persuading a significant cohort of 
Scalia’s fellows in the polity that immigrants are not the threat that they believe them to be.  
Breaking down the negative socio-political construction of migrants, encapsulated by Justice 
Scalia’s laundry list of the “evils” of illegal immigration,68 is a predicate to durably changing 
membership norms and to making the regime less harsh.69  Those who feel under siege as a result 
of undocumented migration must be persuaded of the empirical view—which most scholars doing 
normative work in this field already ascribe to—that their imperilment by immigrants is an exag-
geration or a fiction. 
But why not simply leave all this persuasion to the political process?  What does law 
and, particularly, legal scholarship have to do with this?  After all, Obama’s Rose Garden speech 
was a moving call to fellow Americans to acknowledge that DREAMers are American in all but 
name.  There is reason to be skeptical of the power of this high-level discourse.  Obama’s plea 
engages the polity at a level of abstraction far too removed to be effective at alleviating the kinds 
of fears and concerns that motivated Arizona and other states and localities to act to enforce exist-
ing immigration laws or create their own.  Social science research tells us that stereotypes break 
down through a series of interpersonal encounters, for instance, by working closely with someone 
who is a member of a disfavored group.70  But language barriers and segregation by occupation 
                                                                
 68 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2519 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What I do fear—and what 
Arizona and the States that support it fear—is that ‘federal policies’ of nonenforcement will leave the States helpless be-
fore those evil effects of illegal immigration . . . .”). 
 69 The predicate also applies to the adoption of a European Union-like regional scheme that combines regional 
economic investment, free trade, and liberalized migration.  See JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supra note 2, at 
160-66 (discussing a European Union-like arrangement for the Americas). 
 70 See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Ac-
tion,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1101 (2006) (detailing the “social contact hypothesis,” which suggests that stereotypes and 
prejudice can be broken down with face-to-face interactions of individuals from different social categories).  See also Cass 
R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 757-58 (positing the existence of availability cascades, where-
by “media coverage of gripping and unrepresentative incidents” creates durable and empirically invalid social beliefs 
about social phenomena).  Mary Fan has discussed the applicability of this theory to views about immigration. See Fan, 
The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, supra note 3, at 40-47; Fan, Post-Racial Proxies, 
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and residence inhibit these interactions.  Absent an ongoing practice of persuasion at a micro-
level, or a radical reduction in the social distance between citizens and migrants, the President’s 
ability to successfully persuade those who favor a restrictive approach to immigration policy is 
severely compromised. Persuasion is also about the effective cultivation of empathy.  The Presi-
dent’s view, or the Supreme Court’s, can be dismissed by the citizenry as representing the self-
interested acts of the political elite.  Contrast that to a small group of citizens deciding to grant 
relief to an “illegal” immigrant.  Such an act is not as easily dismissed by a fellow citizen.71  The 
empathetic distance the public imagination has to travel is lower, and the story of ulterior motive 
is harder to sustain.  A citizen that grants relief as a jury member is just like the besieged citizen 
on whose behalf Scalia claims to be speaking. 
The fact also remains that the exclusion of migrants from participation in our representa-
tive democracy produces a classic and extreme political-process problem.  The courts’ ability to 
address this problem is hampered by the fact that the exclusion of migrants from the polity has 
strong normative support, meaning that courts would be taking unpopular, counter-majoritarian 
corrective actions.72  However, this limitation does not mean that law is impotent in this arena.  
We must think of how law can create conditions that could help to construct a lasting political 
majority that favors treating migrants more generously.  The existing structural conditions are not 
conducive to this possibility.73 
Yet aren’t migrants beginning to advocate on their own behalf and to form just those 
kinds of coalitions?74  Won’t the political problem be resolved through a purely political solu-
tion?75  Hasn’t the re-election of President Obama brought some new urgency to immigration re-
                                                                
supra note 37, at 943-44. 
 71 The psychologist Daniel Kahneman observes that the structure of our cognitive processing is biased in fa-
vor of quick, non-deliberative judgments.  This structure produces a well-documented series of systematic biases in deci-
sion-making that are difficult to combat.  Difficult, however, does not mean impossible, and the psychology literature has 
documented methods to deploy our heuristic decision-making process to combat incorrect judgments.  For instance, “sur-
prising individual cases” contradicting long-held beliefs have “a more powerful impact” because they require an individual 
to resolve “the incongruity . . . [via] a casual story.”  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 174 (2011).  Addi-
tionally, “[p]ersonal experiences, pictures, and vivid examples are more available than incidents that happened to others, 
or mere words, or statistics.”  Id. at 130. 
 72 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (ad-
vocating that the Supreme Court should devote itself to majority governance while advocating for minority rights). 
 73 The only structural element of the immigration regime that consistently works in migrants’ favor is the ex-
pansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship provision.  That interpretation has consistently 
prevented the perpetuation of a racially denominated, intergenerational caste labor regime.  For discussion, see Morales, In 
Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 79-82. 
 74 See Room for Debate, Is Getting on the ‘UndocuBus’ a Good Idea?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/01/is-getting-on-the-undocubus-a-good-idea (featuring different commentators 
discussing the UndocuBus phenomenon and the implications of undocumented immigrants publically advocating on their 
own behalf). 
 75 I am skeptical of the view that the growth of the Latino population within the citizenry guarantees a durable 
increase in political regard for those of a similar ethnic or racial background.  Human beings have proven quite capable of 
generating self-serving distinctions among their fellows in an effort to protect the existing distribution of entitlements, like 
land or citizenship.  A shared ethnicity is no guarantee of fellowship.  For instance, co-ethnic employers can take ad-
vantage of the vulnerability of their employees. See, e.g., Millian Kang, Manicuring Intimacies: Inequalities and Re-
sistance in Nail Salon Work, in INTIMATE LABORS: CULTURES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE POLITICS OF CARE 217, 222-23 
(Eileen Boris & Rhacel Salazar Parreñas ed., 2010) (discussing the potential for abuse that arises in a co-ethnic employ-
ment environment).  Likewise, the global history of slavery and racial conflict shows the creativity that human beings ap-
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form?  It is true that political movements by migrants are making headway.  With young, undoc-
umented migrants dramatically “coming out” in recent years to challenge the legitimacy of their 
illegal status, movements like UndocuBus, a bus full of undocumented immigrants that travels 
around the country building support for immigration amnesty,76 and events like A Day Without an 
Immigrant, a kind of categorical general protest,77 undocumented people are becoming more visi-
ble and that visibility is challenging their social construction as criminals and “takers.” 
These tactics are part of the picture of social change, but I am skeptical that they will be 
sufficient particularly at furthering reformers’ most ambitious long-term goals.  The movement 
for status and formal inclusion on behalf of undocumented people has patterned itself on the Afri-
can-American Civil Rights movement, but has not grappled adequately with the fact that African-
Americans advocated for de facto inclusion in the polity from a starting position of de jure mem-
bership.  It is very different to argue to your fellow citizens that you are not being treated like a 
citizen ought to be for some arbitrary reason, than to say: I came here in violation of the laws that 
make up your social contract, but I have contributed to your society and now you should recog-
nize me as a citizen.  The latter argument runs roughly against the grain of public intuitions and 
norms of sovereignty in a way that citizen-grounded rights movements do not.78  In addition to the 
usual problems presented by securing public goods to benefit disfavored groups, it also requires 
challenging what Linda Bosniak calls “normative nationalism”: the core norm that anchors the 
modern international system of nation states—a tall order indeed.79  While “earned” inclusion—
the idea that migrants’ contributions to the polity earn them better treatment—is the case that 
ought to be made to citizens it is unlikely to succeed in altering the character of the regime over 
the long run unless that narrative takes root among ordinary citizens.80  To do this requires more 
than a cyclical large-scale discussion about migrants’ treatment every few decades.  What is need-
ed is a sustained, smaller-scale, discussion about the boundaries of membership in the body poli-
tic.  That kind of conversation requires an institutional anchor, like having a jury decide the fate 
of long-standing undocumented migrants.  Reformers need to devote attention to conceiving of 
ways of grounding and sustaining discussion about non-citizens. 
Moreover, the visibility that migrants are embracing does not have the same meaning as 
the visibility harnessed in the Civil Rights movement.  Despite the rhetoric of non-violence that 
                                                                
ply to turn superficial differences between them into meaningful markers of substantive flaws that lower the worth of 
those so stigmatized.  Certainly, the fact that the ancestors of all U.S. citizens, excepting Native Americans, were once 
migrants has not prevented the development of a fairly ungenerous immigration regime. 
 76 See, e.g., Lawrence Downes, The UndocuBus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://takingnote.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/the-undocubus/ (describing the Undocubus phenomenon). 
 77 See, e.g., Anita Hamilton, A Day Without Immigrants: Making a Statement, TIME (May 1, 2006), http:// 
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1189899,00.html (describing the national day of protest, involving marches and 
worker boycotts, meant to draw attention to the “essential [role] [that immigrants play in] the U.S. economy and [that 
they] deserve the right to continue living and working [in the country]”). 
 78 The fact that the DREAMers did not succeed in the legislature despite their characterization as sympathetic 
innocents by the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, and in the President’s Rose Garden speech, underscores the difficulty.  
See generally, Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (holding that discriminating children based on the legality of their 
immigrant status, over which the children had “little control,” violated the 14th Amendment); President Obama, Remarks 
on Immigration, supra note 27.  Those on the UndocuBus probably face an even greater struggle, as they were aware of 
their legal violation when they immigrated, making them more culpable in the eyes of the citizenry. 
 79 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 153. 
 80 For more on this concept of “earned citizenship,” see Ayelet Schahar, Earned Citizenship: Property Les-
sons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 140 (2011). 
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the Civil Rights movement embraced, it was actually seeking out violence in a very particularly 
way by seeking to create pictures of African-Americans suffering peacefully at the hands of white 
oppressors.  This required a kind of situational goading of white officials to violently abuse them, 
and the corresponding training of movement activists not to reciprocate. 
The immigration regime deploys violence through quiet, out-of-view, administrative and 
legal processes that often end with the removal of a person from United States territory.  This dis-
tinction makes the immigration regime significantly harder to attack through protest movements.  
And any violence that migrants might bring upon themselves is still colored by the fact of their 
own (or their parents’) unlawful conduct.  The normative strength of the case for migrants’ exclu-
sion discounts the violence done to undocumented people in the same way that conviction for a 
criminal offense does in the American criminal justice system: “illegal” provides the same excuse 
for poor treatment that “criminal” does.  While law and legal institutions have a critical role to 
play in the process of changing the trajectory of the immigration regime, they will have to be de-
ployed in unconventional ways to do so effectively.  As of now the operation of law and legal in-
stitutions contribute to the regime’s harsh character.81 
                                                                
 81 Of course, I am not the first to notice that something is amiss in the reform literature, though my diagnosis 
and prescription are distinctive.  For example, Linda Bosniak has recently called on pro-immigrant progressive scholars to 
turn the tools of “critical social and political theory” usually deployed to destabilize the foundation assumptions of the 
immigration regime, “on our own ideas and practices . . . [in order to] recognize them as part of the social world we are 
engaged with and that we are studying.”  Linda Bosniak, Arguing for Amnesty, LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 1-4 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/01/06/1743872111423181.full.pdf.  Bosniak’s primary concern 
is the critical neglect of the “underside” of crafting normative arguments for immigration amnesty for undocumented peo-
ple.  “As [pro-immigrant progressive] scholars elaborate reasons for moral concern, we are implicitly excluding some 
classes of people and some reasons for concern.” Id. at 6.  This exclusion through construction is problematic because it 
can frame immigration problems and solutions in ways that “may tie our hands down the line.” Id. 
 Bosniak unpacks several other examples of this phenomenon in the piece and ultimately attributes them to a 
realist impulse among pro-immigrant progressive scholars with cosmopolitan dreams.  Joseph Carens, Bosniak notes, ar-
gued that this impulse to realism is a necessary part of an ethical practice of norm development in the immigration context: 
“whatever we say ought to be done about international migration should not be too far from what we think actually might 
happen [and from] what we think our community might do.” Id. at 10 (quoting Joseph Carens, Realistic and Idealistic Ap-
proaches to the Ethics of Migration, 30 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 156, 157-58 (1996).  Bosniak approves of 
this statement but wants for it not to swallow other possibilities; she wants scholars to continue to pursue more idealistic 
“efforts to critique national border control . . . deportation [and] the ‘national imagination,’” which reinforce politically 
constructed divisions within society like that between the citizen and alien. Bosniak, Arguing for Amnesty, supra note 81, 
at 11. 
 I largely agree with this critique and count myself among Bosniak’s intended audience, though I find the diag-
nosis incomplete and wish to offer at least a partial prescription.  Bosniak wants to encourage a practice and leave open a 
space.  She wants scholars to be self-aware about the form in which progressive migration norms take shape in socio-legal 
discourse.  She suggests that scholars maintain or expand a space in this intellectual community that is immune from hav-
ing to discipline its normative imagination, to where new norms can be imagined without limitations by contemporary 
social realities. This suggestion may be unnecessary, as that literature appears to be alive and kicking: Jacqueline Stevens, 
Arash Abizadeh, Ayelet Schahar, Audrey Macklin, not to mention Bosniak herself, are actively engaged in the space of 
idealistic theory that Bosniak fears losing. 
 So, the lack of space or commitment to the cosmopolitan imagination is not the most pressing problem for the 
audience Bosniak addresses.  What is urgently wrong is that the literature fails to account for how these theoretical discus-
sions are to relate to the real world.  The compromised “practical” scholarly arguments that Bosniak critiques are flawed in 
part because they are not executed with an eye towards the endgame.  They are inevitably ad hoc and incompletely theo-
rized because there is no framework for thinking about how society should or can move from here—the national imagina-
tion—to there—the world with more porous borders. 
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The next section builds support for my claim that immigration law is becoming increas-
ingly punitive, and describes the contours of this deep-rooted and problematic phenomenon.  It 
begins with a brief discussion of the recent landmark case, Padilla v. Kentucky, in which the Su-
preme Court held that the right to effective assistance of counsel is violated where a defense at-
torney fails to advise a criminal defendant of immigration consequences likely to result from a 
criminal conviction.82  Generally, Padilla is seen as a significant victory for the immigration 
rights movement, as well as a hopeful sign of the Supreme Court’s increased willingness to ex-
pand migrants’ rights.83  However, as this article suggests, the decision is better viewed as a trou-
bling symptom of the immigration regime’s progress along a punitive trajectory.  Following an 
examination of Padilla, this article provides a sketch of the crucial features of this trend by sur-
veying the work of a demographer and two political scientists. 
II. THE SHAPE OF THE ENTRENCHED IMMIGRATION REGIME 
The immigration regime is entrenched, but it is not static.  The practices that make up the 
regime are changing all the time, yet the changes are the product of a stable structural dynamic.  
That stability has ensured that the character of the regime is stable, too. The immigration regime 
may change, but the long-term trend is for migrants to be treated more harshly.  Scholars have no-
ticed this,84 though their reform programs have not sufficiently accounted for it. 
In this section, I develop the claim that the immigration regime is entrenched for struc-
tural reasons, namely, the way that political, social, and legal forces interact in response to the 
continuing migration of South and Central American citizens to the United States without its ex-
press permission.  This is an intricate story that I will not exhaust in this article.  My aim is in-
stead to provide enough detail to reveal the lever that can alter the forces that reproduce the char-
acter of the regime. 
As I will show, the citizenry is the key lever in the process of change: it has the free 
will85 and political authority to move the regime in the direction scholars believe it ought to go.  
But as of now, the other structural forces at play have given citizens a distorted view of the do-
                                                                
 The trouble is that “realists” are not realistic enough because their prescriptions for immigration change fail to 
account for the social and political processes that are required to bring the change they advocate about.  The failure of such 
scholars to reckon with the reciprocal effect of the arguments for immigration change on the discourse of those with op-
posing normative commitments, like the citizens for whom Scalia spoke in his Arizona dissent, is just one example of a 
more general myopia.  Having President Obama grant deferred action to DREAMers because they cannot be thought re-
sponsible for violating the law as children, not only discounts the moral worth of the non-DREAMer, it also opens up 
space for an argument in the opposing camp that urges that the executive action was undemocratic or an act of bad faith.  
Feeding this argument also “tie[s] our hands down the line.”  Bosniak, Arguing for Amnesty, supra note 81, at 6.  If pro-
immigrant progressive scholars accept that democracy is something worth preserving and enriching, then they have to im-
agine paths to the cosmopolis that work within democratic norms.  Prescriptions for immigration change must account for 
the social and political processes that will bring that change about.  Immigration scholars, then, need to rely on a fuller 
account of social facts, but resist deferring to all of them as if they were laws of physics. 
 82 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 83 See Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1463. 
 84 See, e.g., supra notes 59 and 60. 
 85 I use the phrase “free will” to describe the ability of human beings to change their minds about the world 
and to convey the link between long-standing moral and religious views of human agency and the more contemporary dis-
cussion of social plasticity in the literature on social change.  See, e.g., UNGER, supra note 53, at 138, 193 (theorizing on 
the processes underlying social change). 
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mestic impact of migrants’ presence.  Finding a way to correct this distortion and bring citizens’ 
views into line with the empirical reality of migrants’ effects may disrupt the structures that cause 
entrenchment. 
A. Padilla v. Kentucky: Evidence of Immigration Law’s Harsh Trajectory 
The Supreme Court’s grant of habeas corpus relief in Padilla v. Kentucky has been hailed 
as a landmark moment in the judicial recognition of immigrants’ rights.86  Yet, the Supreme 
Court’s ineffective assistance finding still left José Padilla, a 40-year legal permanent resident of 
the United States and Vietnam War veteran, in legal limbo when it came to the relief that mattered 
most: the ability to remain in the United States.87  And even the broader importance of the rule 
that Padilla ushered in, requiring defense counsel to advise clients on the clear deportation conse-
quence of criminal convictions, has been deemed by at least one prominent scholar not to amount 
to meaningful procedural protection.88  Padilla exemplifies the problem with the due-process ap-
proach: it has no effect on the substantive law that makes deportation a virtually automatic conse-
quence of criminal conviction. 
Whether Padilla is effective or not in its stated purpose is of less interest to me than what 
it reveals about the limits of migrants’ rights in a democracy committed to the idea that citizen-
ship should make a difference in the allocation of legal protections and social resources.89  That 
Padilla is both so paltry in the actual protection it affords non-citizens—even long-standing ones 
who served their country honorably in the military—and yet can still be hailed as a great triumph 
of immigrants’ rights, underscores that the courts lack the authority to serve the role in immigra-
tion reform that they did in the African-American Civil Rights movement.  Without courts as a 
counter-majoritarian check, and with non-citizens unrepresented in electoral politics,90 methods of 
changing the path of immigration law are highly constrained. 
This constraint is clearly demonstrated in Padilla, in the way the Supreme Court ground-
ed the right of a migrant to accurate advice on clear immigration consequences in the increasing 
harshness of the immigration regime.  As Justice Stevens put it: 
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the 
last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses 
                                                                
 86 Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1463 (describing the Supreme Court’s recognition as “pathbreaking” and “very 
significant”). 
 87 On remand from the Supreme Court the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that Padilla was prejudiced by 
his counsel’s failure to give him correct advice about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and ordered the 
lower court to vacate the conviction.  See Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. App. Ct. 2012).  Still, Padilla 
may be prosecuted anew on the same charges; if convicted he would again be deportable.  See Cesar Garcia Hernandez, 
KY CT APP: PADILLA’S CONVICTION VACATED, CRIMMIGRATION (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration 
.com/2012/10/25/ky-ct-app-padillas-conviction-vacated.aspx. 
 88 See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2011) (noting 
that Padilla fails to improve the “limited procedural possibilities for avoiding or mitigating” the deportation consequences 
of a criminal conviction). 
 89 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2006) (“[N]oncitizens are not always treated like citizens. . . . ‘all men are created 
equal’ only if those ‘men’ are not noncitizens.”). 
 90 See Benton, supra note 2, at 407 (observing that non-citizens are “definitionally dominated in the [demo-
cratic] tradition as they are not citizens, and citizenship is necessary in order to be non-dominated”). 
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and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immi-
gration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and 
limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deporta-
tion. The ‘‘drastic measure’’ of deportation or removal is now virtually inevita-
ble for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.91 
Stevens continued, cataloging in detail the legislative perambulations that have facilitat-
ed ever-higher level of deportations. 
Changing times, laws, or practices, can of course produce responses by the Supreme 
Court meant to ensure that constitutional principles keep up with contemporary practices and mo-
res.  But such reactions also indicate that the state of affairs producing the constitutional reaction 
is relatively durable; the Court is unlikely to stake out a new right if the practice that produces the 
need for constitutional protection is temporary.  Indeed, part of the rationale for finding the new 
right articulated in Padilla hinged on the fact that the defense bar had for many years been rec-
ommending that defense attorneys advise clients on the collateral immigration consequences of 
convictions, itself an indication that the problem was one of longstanding and increasing im-
portance to criminal defendant clients.  In Padilla, then, the fact that a majority of the Supreme 
Court felt that a constitutional innovation was required because of the progressively more ample 
grounds upon which deportation could be triggered, in addition to the increasingly restricted 
means by which those effects could be commuted, indicates that an ungenerous legal posture to-
wards migrants is strongly anchored. 
Padilla also showcases another problem with the migrants’ rights framework: it has a 
negative impact on social meaning.  Because migrants cannot be full rights-holders as a result of 
their position outside the polity, the Court ties rights-generation to a small subset of statuses.  In 
Padilla, the relevant status that triggers the right to accurate information from legal counsel is not 
“migrant,” but instead “criminal.”  The right to advice about immigration consequences is thus a 
function of a migrant’s presence in criminal proceedings.  A migrant does not have a right to legal 
advice in civil deportation proceedings commencing after a criminal sentence is served, for exam-
ple.92  Padilla, then, constructs migrants as criminal rights-bearers, not as rights-bearers in gen-
eral.93  That construction of migrants as rights-bearers in the criminal context is problematic, of 
course, because the social association of migrants with criminality is precisely what needs to be 
overcome if the character of the immigration regime is to change. 
And Padilla is not the only “migrants’ rights” decision that came with a price.  The Su-
preme Court’s last such landmark decision, Plyler v. Doe, took similar form.94  While Plyler held 
that a Texas law which sought to prevent the enrollment of children in public schools based on 
                                                                
 91 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 92 Some scholars maintain that this right might logically follow from the reasoning in Padilla. See, e.g., Kan-
stroom, supra note 4, at 1482 (“Deportation—which by itself is not  protected  by  the  Sixth Amendment—flows  from  
and comes  after  a  criminal  conviction,  but it is now viewed  as  an  inextricable  part  of  the  criminal  process.”).  But 
see, e.g., Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings, supra note 4, at 14 (“The Sixth Amendment is . . . 
expressly limited to ‘criminal prosecutions,’ and even the Supreme Court in Padilla depicted deportation proceedings only 
as a criminal-civil hybrid, not a subspecies of criminal proceedings.”). 
 93 This could be said of any right.  The difference with migrants is that the situations in which they bear rights 
in the United States are so narrow that the meanings of those particular contexts in which rights are granted has a defining 
effect. 
 94 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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their immigration status violated equal protection, this “ultimate”95 migrants’ rights decision was 
“structured . . . around an opposition between the ‘innocent children’ and their culpable parents,” 
who “‘elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law,’ and who, as a result, 
‘should be prepared to bear the consequences.’”96  The right of children to attend public schools 
irrespective of immigration status was thus grounded not in their status as persons, per se, but in 
the fact that they lacked the scienter required to make them culpable lawbreakers—a state of mind 
that their parents clearly met, in the Court’s view.97  The parents were painted by the court in 
starkly negative terms in order to make their children innocents worthy of rights.98 
The elaboration of migrants’ rights via the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability to per-
sons—not only citizens—can obscure the difficulties presented in attempting to turn the domestic 
rights of persons into a species of international human rights.  Additionally, we can see a pattern 
in judicial and executive acts of “rights” construction: granting relief to some sub-group of mi-
grants usually requires the construction of another sub-group unworthy of the same munificence. 
Padilla is a symptom of the immigration regime’s entrenchment.  The fact that there is a 
need for a constitutional response to the inflexibility of the immigration regime is evidence that 
the inflexibility is relatively permanent.  And the need to maintain a legal distinction between citi-
zens and migrants in law and politics usually requires that relief from the immigration regime’s 
harshness be granted by drawing a line between “worthy” and “unworthy” migrants.  This line-
drawing has the negative social implication of generally re-affirming the case for the immigration 
regime’s harshness, because that character is grounded in the social belief that migrants are 
threatening or less worthy of citizens’ regard than fellow citizens.  In this way, the process of 
counter-majoritarian rights-generation can involve the affirmation of social beliefs that make fu-
ture rights-generation more democratically challenging.  Drawing the line in this way eventually 
tarnishes migrants and migration in general because migrants are all “other,” in some sense, from 
the citizenry’s perspective. 
B. The Enforcement Feedback Loop 
The Supreme Court’s assessment of immigration law’s entrenched punitiveness is sup-
ported by statistical analysis.  Demographers Douglas Massey and Karen Pren cross-referenced 
legislative changes in immigration law over the past sixty years with an enormous data set of so-
cial statistics collected over the same period.  From a series of regression analyses they conclude, 
among other things, that 
the rise of illegal migration, its framing as a threat to the nation, and the result-
ing conservative reaction set off a self-feeding chain reaction of enforcement 
that generated more apprehensions even though the flow of undocumented mi-
grants had stabilized in the late 1970s and actually dropped during the late 
                                                                
 95 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 66. 
 96 Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 224). 
 97 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.  Bosniak is correct to point out that the federal government also received judicial 
opprobrium, given its failure adequately to enforce the southern border or prevent migrants from obtaining jobs.  Howev-
er, that criticism is really the same side of the migrant/criminal coin: Increased border policing, as well as de-legitimizing 
migrant labor by forbidding employers to hire migrants who lack status, feeds into the social meaning of migrants as law-
breakers and criminals.  See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 66. 
 98 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 68. 
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1980s and early 1990s. . . After the late 1970s . . . anti-immigrant sentiment in-
creasingly fed off itself to drive the bureaucratic machinery of enforcement 
forward to new heights, despite the lack of any real increase in illegal migra-
tion.99 
The process that generates the escalating punitiveness noted by Justice Stevens in Pa-
dilla is a feedback loop, whereby increased border apprehensions produce a threatened polity that 
demands more apprehensions.  The problem is that the apprehensions do not mitigate the threat—
they only confirm the rightness of feeling threatened.  In this way, enforcement does little but 
stoke demand for more border apprehensions. 
In response, the government devotes increasing amounts of resources or man-hours to 
border enforcement, “independently of the actual number of illegal border entries.”100  Between 
1977 and 1995, “the number of [Border Patrol hours] doubled, the number of Border Patrol 
Agents increased 2.5 times, and the Border Patrol budget rose by a factor of 6.5.  During and after 
the 1970s . . . the border build-up was increasingly disconnected from the actual traffic in illegal 
migrants.”101  Enforcement action breeds a desire for more enforcement, even as the underlying 
phenomenon that triggered the initial response declines in significance.102  Strikingly, the fact of 
declining unlawful entries does not enter political or legal consciousness. 
The dynamic Massey and Pren describe can also be elaborated by means of William 
Eskridge’s and John Ferejohn’s theory of statutory entrenchment.103  Unlike the Massey and Pren 
model, which illustrates the dynamic reaction between popular sentiments and the political and 
administrative systems’ responses to it, statutory entrenchment theory focuses on the ways in 
which heuristics build up among legislators and fix legislative approaches to addressing particular 
social problems.  A sufficiently reflexive approach to legislative problem-solving can be de-
scribed as either morally or cognitively entrenched: cognitive entrenchment takes place “where a 
legal model is understood as appropriate and rational[;] . . . legislators perceive these cognitively 
entrenched models to make sense and represent smart lawmaking,”104 although whether this is ac-
curate from an external point of view is a different question.105  Moral entrenchment, on the other 
hand, occurs “where lawmakers consider the model to be just and right.”106  These types of mod-
els “at the least serve as a signal to supporters that the lawmakers are paying attention to their be-
liefs.”107 
                                                                
 99 Douglas S. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: Explaining the 
Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1, 9 (2012). 
 100 Id. at 13. 
 101 Id. at 14. 
 102 As Massey and Pren put it, their model suggests that between “1965 and 1995 rising apprehensions pro-
duced a conservative [pro-aggressive enforcement] reaction that led to strengthened enforcement and hence more appre-
hensions, further exacerbating the conservative reaction.” Id.  For a legal-cultural description of this self-reinforcing phe-
nomenon see also Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 69. 
 103 See generally John D. Skrentny & Micah Gell-Redman, Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the Dy-
namics of Statutory Entrenchment, 120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 325, 326 (2011) (adapting and extending the theory of statutory 
entrenchment developed in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (2010)). 
 104 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 328. 
 105 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 329 n.17. 
 106 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 329. 
 107 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 329. 
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In essence, there are different types of default heuristic responses among legislators, and 
the more entrenched the responses are, the more difficult it will be for interest groups who seek 
outcomes running against the assumptions embedded in these heuristics to mount arguments that 
can prevail in law.  Scholars identify the border enforcement model as both “cognitively and mor-
ally entrenched, and the entrenchment is deep,”108 despite the border enforcement model’s “obvi-
ous failure.”109  The persistence of the approach in the face of its ineffectiveness is explained as a 
function of statutory entrenchment: “[T]he perceived moral entrenchment and imperative of bor-
der enforcement (by both lawmakers and much of the public) may be diminishing the perception 
of the reality of its failure.”110  This conclusion accords with Massey and Pren’s feedback model, 
which shows that border apprehensions create a political response that produces a demand for 
more enforcement, and enforcement legislation, even as the rate of undocumented migration de-
clines: it is now at net zero, yet border enforcement expenditures continue to increase.111 
C. Diagnostic Precision/Under-theorized Prescriptions 
Against the grain of the immigration law literature, the scholars discussed above are 
thickly engaged with the social fact that the ungenerous trajectory of the immigration regime is 
entrenched, a product of legislative choices made long ago, and the accretion of political, social, 
and legal responses to the phenomenon of migration from Central and South America over the 
last half-century.  To scholars committed to the normative rightness of open borders or immigra-
tion amnesty, Skrentny and Gell-Redman point out that those goals are “not entrenched at all.112  
“The dearth of statutory precedents for mass categorical legalization of economic migrants, and 
the perceived failure of IRCA (the only mass legalization statute), ensure that there is no broad 
understanding of legalization as a rational or moral approach to immigration lawmaking.”113  
President Obama’s grant of deferred action to DREAMers underscores this point because it took 
place in the absence of legislative action. 
Reformers could point out that while the barriers to amnesty are “morally and cognitive-
ly entrenched,”114 that does not mean that amnesty is immoral or unjust.  Indeed, there is a schol-
                                                                
 108 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 344. 
 109 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 344. 
 110 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 344. 
 111 See Securing the Borders and America’s Points of Entry: What Remains to Be Done: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25-27 (2009) 
(statement of Dr. Douglas Massey, Professor of Sociology and Pub. Affairs, Princeton Univ.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55033/pdf/CHRG-111shrg55033.pdf [hereinafter Massey Senate Hearing 
Testimony].  President Obama’s plan for comprehensive immigration reform continues to emphasize border enforcement 
noting that there is “more work to do” in order to secure the border. See Fact Sheet, supra note 24,  The legislative plan 
proposed by a bipartisan group of Senators takes an even stronger position on the necessity of border closure calling for a 
commission of border state officials and citizens to declare the border secure before any amnesty can take place.  Erica 
Werner, Senate Group Focuses on Border Security, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.usnews 
.com/news/politics/articles/2013/01/31/senator-outlines-obstacles-to-immigration-deal. 
 112 See Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 344. 
 113 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 344. One might contend that the statutory entrenchment mod-
el is a poor descriptive fit for mass categorical amnesty because they must of necessity happen infrequently.  While recent 
political rhetoric has begun to articulate the case for immigration amnesty, it is significant that President Obama has been 
careful avoid couching that message in moral terms.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
 114 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 329. 
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arly consensus that the current immigration regime is unjust, unfair or sub-optimal.115  Still, the 
problem remains: how to persuade those with power that this is true and that sustained action and 
attention are required to right the regime?  Massey, Pren, Skrentny, and Gell-Redman offer some 
possibilities, but their approaches underscore the need for more creative thinking on these ques-
tions.  Massey and Pren conclude their analysis by imagining a counterfactual scenario where a 
Congress that adequately considered “the underlying dynamics of the social processes in-
volved”116 in undocumented migration might have avoided creating millions of migrants living 
outside the law with more precise and thoughtful calibration of its policy response.  In the face of 
the fact that “11 million persons [are] currently present without authorization” Massey and Pren 
point to the rightness of implementing a large scale categorical amnesty for the three million un-
documented people who entered as children (including DREAMers), and “for those who entered 
the United States illegally as adults” they suggest an earned legalization program: “migrants could 
accumulate points for learning English, taking civics courses, paying taxes, and having US citizen 
children.”117 
Skrentny and Gell-Redman offer that the way around the amnesty impasse is to adopt a 
European model of “a permanent statutory legalization process on an individual rather than cate-
gorical basis,”118 along with a shift in the political discourse to turn undocumented migration into 
a question of free trade rather than sovereign violation. 
Both of these prescriptive suggestions, however, fail to take seriously enough the struc-
tural constraints that the authors themselves describe.  Massey and Pren have set out a compelling 
picture of an entrenched landscape of ungenerous immigration policy where the key force of pro-
pulsion is the views of the citizenry, and, more particularly, their inaccurate understanding of the 
threat undocumented migration poses.  Yet Massey and Pren pine for a Congress—an institution 
ultimately accountable to the people—that might have acted more like the Philosopher King, per-
fectly calibrating its response to the underlying social and economic dynamics of migration.  That 
vision of Congress is fantastical.  Massey and Pren’s observation that “Congress . . . makes con-
sequential policy decisions with scant consideration of the underlying dynamics of the social pro-
cesses involved,”119 is a structural flaw that is particularly acute in the immigration context be-
cause of another structural problem: immigrants are not represented in Congress.  Massey and 
Pren’s failure to see this is emblematic of a more broadly observable blindness to structural dy-
namics that afflicts the immigration law reform literature. 
Skrentny and Gell-Redman, though somewhat more innovative and properly attuned to 
the need for an ongoing process for legalizing people unlawfully present, are similarly in denial 
about the implication of their own descriptions of legislative entrenchment for their proposed re-
form.  The United States has for many decades possessed a permanent individualized statutory 
legalization process120 and it has been the subject of legislative anxiety and increasing restriction 
over the same period where Skrentny and Gell-Redman analyze congressional legislation to sup-
port their findings of cognitive and moral entrenchment for un-liberal policy responses. As for 
                                                                
 115 See supra note 2 illustrating many examples of scholarship holding this view. 
 116 Massey & Pren, supra note 99, at 24. 
 117 Massey & Pren, supra note 99, at 26. 
 118 Skrentny & Gell-Redman, supra note 103, at 345. 
 119 Massey & Pren, supra note 99, at 24. 
 120 A limited form of relief available to some immigrants who are in removal proceedings is provided for in the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act Section 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2008).  This relief, cancellation of removal, sus-
pends the immigrant’s removal proceedings, potentially indefinitely, though it does not confer any sort of legal immigra-
tion status or provide any assurance of immunity from future removal proceedings. 
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their proposed frame-shift among legislators and the polity to view undocumented labor as a ques-
tion of free trade rather than sovereign violation, it offers a discursive tool that is consonant with 
American economic values, but does not account for the fact that immigrants are feared in large 
part because they are thought to threaten the job prospects of low and middle class workers.  Thus 
getting to the laissez-faire economic view on immigrant labor would require reversing an existing 
political frame that appears to be substantially entrenched.  How that frame is to be shifted is left 
wholly unexplained. 
These authors have developed helpful, though incomplete, accounts of how and why the 
current immigration system came to exist and how stable the existing dynamics are, yet their pre-
scriptions suggest that even those who understand the structural characteristics of the regime find 
it difficult to articulate reforms which alter these structures.  Nonetheless, close consideration of 
the landscape they describe is useful.  The authors discussed here seem to see that the immigra-
tion law system is responsive to some significant degree to “We the People’s” concerns about un-
documented migration; they also agree that legal responses inform the way in which the citizenry 
views the problem of undocumented migration.  Law then, can shape citizens’ views, directly or 
indirectly, and it is the citizens’ views that ultimately produce immigration law. 
While the reasoning just discussed may appear circular, the self-perpetuating feedback 
loop that Massey and Pren described has a specific entry point: citizens must make the first move 
because they have the authority to permit or to force change in the immigration regime.  But mov-
ing, or even defining, the will of the citizenry is challenging in general and it is particularly chal-
lenging in the immigration context.  The general difficulty is that the people’s will is not inde-
pendent of all the structural forces that I have described, it is shaped by them: this accounts in part 
for the durability of the direction of the regime.  For example, more immigration enforcement 
creates political demand for still more immigration enforcement, even as undocumented entries 
decline. 
The difficulty specific to immigration is that migrants do not make up a part of the dem-
ocratic will, nor are they full participants in democratic discourse, because they are not citizens.  
As a result, migrants’ own views of how the immigration regime should be structured are not ful-
ly incorporated into the shape of the regime.  Reformers resist these facts in favor of trying to re-
alize the aspiration of migrants’ full political inclusion or by quashing the citizenry’s desires.  I 
urge a different approach to changing the direction of the immigration regime, one that advocates 
legal reforms that work with—not against—the superior claims of the citizenry to the realization 
of their political will. 
One way to appreciate the benefits of such an approach is to understand that the demo-
cratic will is not simply a function of the citizenry’s fixed “interests”121 but that interests and the 
political demands that interests make are based in part on what the citizenry “knows” about a par-
ticular problem.  I call this form of knowing “democratic knowledge.”  Democratic knowledge, as 
opposed to expert knowledge, is accorded a great deal of respect in our culture.  Right now the 
citizenry “knows,” for example, that undocumented migrants steal jobs, leach social services, and 
commit a disproportionate amount of crimes, and legislation proceeds forward based on that 
knowledge.  Knowledge can change, however; it is plastic.  We can learn, or be persuaded.  And 
changes in knowledge do not require the dramatic re-arrangement of political and legal agree-
                                                                
 121 This view of a fixed set of interests is often associated with public choice theory.  See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 65 
(4th ed. 2007), (discussing how public choice theory assumes that “preferences are independent of and prior to political 
activity”). 
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ments or institutions, a particularly important fact given the constrained environment in which 
immigration reformers operate. 
The next section will explain why the high status of democratic knowledge should not be 
directly challenged, why instead the goal should be to alter its content, and what law has to do 
with process.  I then unpack an example of how democratic knowledge of undocumented migra-
tion was created in Arizona, in an effort to show how reformers could seek to change that 
knowledge. 
III. THE IMMIGRATION REGIME AND CITIZEN-MADE KNOWLEDGE 
What citizens demand from politicians in response to migration depends in important 
part on what citizens “know” about immigration.  Yet, what citizens know about immigration, as 
Judge Posner pointed out,122 often deviates from what social scientists, for example, know about 
immigration.  But when it comes to making laws the democratic form of knowledge trumps eve-
rything else.  The authority of democratic knowledge is a feature of our legal and political culture 
generally, but democratic knowledge is particularly authoritative where immigration is concerned. 
Changing the trajectory of the immigration regime depends on changing what citizens 
know about immigration.  Law has an important role to play in the production of migrant-
favorable democratic knowledge, but because migrants are not members of the citizenry, the role 
of law will need to be different than in other contexts, like the African-American Civil Rights 
movement, which sought to change democratic knowledge relating to a group of citizens.  In par-
ticular, law needs to create democratic knowledge from the bottom-up.  The law can do this, for 
example, by creating legal procedures where citizens must confront the reality of the immigration 
regime’s effects on non-citizens, like the example of the immigration jury.123  The grant or denial 
of relief to an “illegal” migrant by a jury of citizens creates democratically constituted knowledge 
about an undocumented migrant’s worthiness that is based on concrete facts provided to the jury 
by a flesh-and- blood person.  And if such a jury grants relief, that grant becomes democratic 
knowledge of migrants’ worthiness, entitled to the respect that brand of knowledge receives in our 
culture.  These conditions are more favorable to the kind of persuasive work that reformers must 
accomplish if the character of the regime is to durably change.   
A. The Supremacy of Democratic Knowledge 
Why does changing the trajectory of the immigration regime depend on what the citizen-
ry knows about immigration?  The answer has two parts.  First, the democratic will is particularly 
authoritative over this area of law and policy, and the democratic will acts on democratic 
knowledge.  Democratic knowledge, like the default models for legislative decision-making de-
scribed by Skrentny and Gell-Redman, shapes the demands made by the democratic will.  Second, 
as discussed in the preceding section, immigration reform operates in a highly constrained envi-
ronment.  So the question for reformers should be: what force operating in this system is suscepti-
ble to a reorientation?  I urge that democratic knowledge is such a force: what humans know and 
what they think about the world is plastic.  Just as what the citizenry “knew” about African-
Americans changed over the course of the twentieth century, and just as immigration reformers 
have convinced themselves that common knowledge about immigration is incorrect, so the citi-
                                                                
 122 See Posner, supra note 35. 
 123 See supra note 13. 
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zenry can come to know that migrants are not a threat and are worthy of inclusion in the body pol-
itic.  Note, though, that changing democratic knowledge differs in an important way from replac-
ing democratic knowledge with, say, expert knowledge.  Expert knowledge does not have the 
same political authority as democratic knowledge.  For expert knowledge to become democratic 
knowledge it must persuade the citizenry of its validity. 
Earlier, I observed that when Justice Scalia argued in his Arizona dissent that Arizonans 
“feel themselves under siege,” he was not making an empirical claim about the impact of undoc-
umented immigration on the state of Arizona.124  Rather, he was elaborating on Arizonans’ sub-
jective emotional state of being.  By the force of his antecedent doctrinal analysis, which empha-
sized Arizona’s sovereign prerogative, Scalia was arguing that these feeling were proper grounds 
for legislation.  Though Scalia did not command a majority, this was not because he was utterly 
wrong about Arizona’s ability to legislate from its “gut” and conform to the Constitution; on that 
he was mostly right.  The problem for Arizona in its case before the Court was simply that the 
“gut” of the national legislature trumped its own.  It is important for reformers to appreciate this 
difference.  A supremacy skirmish, like Arizona, which decides which subset of the democratic 
will shall have the authority to do this or that to migrants, does not undermine the priority of the 
citizenry’s desires, and the knowledge that feeds these desires, over the needs or “rights” of mi-
grants. 
Paul Kahn has observed that popular sovereignty and its corollary, the popular will, are 
“uniquely” authoritative in the American culture of political legitimacy.125  He makes this point in 
part by observing that rights in the United States do not exist independent of the democratic 
will—they are grounded by it: “We only get to the discourse of rights when we ask [by means of 
Constitutional analysis] what it is that the popular sovereign says . . . This relative priority of pop-
ular sovereignty over rights . . . points to a uniquely American culture of Law’s Rule.”126  The 
priority of popular sovereignty has broad implications.  One important implication is that the 
knowledge that composes manifestations of popular sovereignty, like legislation, is also held in 
high esteem.127  This epistemological priority is clearest in the manner that the United States or-
ganizes its administrative state, which is strikingly subservient to the other branches of govern-
ment, a reality that often undermines its purpose, which is in part to provide government with po-
litical action that is based on less-politicized expertise.128 
If the people’s will is highly respected in general, it is even more respected when that 
will bears on non-citizens;129 this is the basic logic behind the plenary authority doctrine, “[t]he 
single most salient feature of the government’s immigration power.”130  That power over non-
citizens is “substantially unconstrained as a constitutional matter.”131 The lack of constraint is a 
central object of reform efforts, but it also should be seen to reflect the “uniquely American cul-
ture of law’s rule” taking shape in the immigration context.132  Unpacking Kahn’s point, we see 
                                                                
 124 See supra page 61. 
 125 Kahn, supra note 18, at 156. 
 126 Kahn, supra note 18, at 156.  See also supra note 52 for discussion. 
 127 See, e.g., Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
897, 912 (2005). 
 128 For a thorough discussion of the administrative state’s devaluation, see Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, 
supra note 8, at 36-41. 
 129 See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 51-52. 
 130 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 50. 
 131 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 50. 
 132 Kahn, supra note 18, at 156. 
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that part of the reason for “the priority of popular sovereignty over rights” is that in our legal cul-
ture there are no culturally authoritative rights—like natural rights—prior to popular sovereignty, 
because the popular sovereign created a delimited set of rights—the Bill of Rights.133  It follows, 
then, that membership in the political community, or the express consent of the political commu-
nity, is a particularly important predicate to the granting of rights or privileges to anyone.134  But 
the democratic will is still more important where the rights of political outsiders, like migrants, 
are concerned.  In a political culture ultimately grounded in a democratic contract (the Constitu-
tion) the views of the citizenry will be particularly respected on the subject of who is or is not a 
member of the community entitled to rights, privileges, or other collective goods, because the po-
litical membership question is logically prior to any grant of rights.  And again, the corollary point 
holds as well: democratic knowledge pertaining to political outsiders is likewise granted great au-
thority. 
This priority of the democratic will means that for the expanded membership project to 
succeed it must create a democratically constituted knowledge that migrants are entitled to legal 
inclusion.  Of course, this is a social and political project as much as a legal one; it cannot occur 
through legal channels alone, nor can it occur without them.  The legal intervention is particularly 
crucial because the political advocacy of migrants begins from a much more impoverished posi-
tion of discursive legitimacy and inclusion than other marginalized groups that have sought civil 
equality: undocumented migrants’ voices are perceived to count less than those of citizens be-
cause of their prior unlawful entry.  Creating an institutional anchor that creates citizen-crafted 
democratic knowledge under conditions that could be favorable to the norm-expanding project 
might provide a legitimate hook from which a broader norm-changing discourse could occur. 
The example of the immigration jury entrusted with the power to change a long-standing 
migrant’s status meets these criteria.  It capitalizes on the fact that due process is the most en-
trenched right that migrants are entitled to, and uses the entrenchment of that norm to build demo-
cratic knowledge that migrants are entitled to membership on an individualized basis.  The demo-
cratic knowledge135 that citizens create can, in turn, populate a broader political and social 
discourse with the assistance of social movements. 
If the production of democratic knowledge is the key to changing the character of the re-
gime, then it is critical to have a thorough understanding of the processes that currently make 
democratic knowledge.  The next section examines select aspects of the conditions that led Arizo-
na to adopt Arizona Senate Bill 1070, the law that was largely overturned by the Supreme Court 
in Arizona v. United States.  Because what happened in Arizona has happened in many other ju-
                                                                
 133 Kahn, supra note 18, at 156. 
 134 Counter-majoritarian shunting of the democratic will, through the judicial expression of constitutional 
rights or otherwise, usually expresses a judgment about the balance between different citizens’ rights, or different and 
competing rights.  Sitting, as migrants do, outside the core boundary of constitutional concern, the expression of their 
rights, such as they are, is usually anchored in a judicially-cognized conception of the good from doing so that will accrue 
to the citizenry.  Undocumented alien children must be permitted to go to public schools, not primarily because they are 
persons with rights, but because the American nation cannot deliberately countenance the presence of an illiterate under-
class.  See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (“By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within 
the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest 
way to the progress of our Nation.”).  
 135 For an analytical review of the literature on the epistemic functionality of deliberative democratic practice 
see generally Peter Fabienne, Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Sepistemology, 6 POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY & 
ECONOMICS  329 (2007). 
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risdictions136 in different forms, examination of the Arizona case allows for a significant degree of 
generalization about the processes that produce democratic knowledge about immigration. 
B. The Shape of Democratic Knowledge: Unpacking the Siege Mentality 
If the citizenry has been conditioned to view the problem of undocumented migration 
through a distorted lens produced in part by legal changes that are now entrenched, then creating 
the conditions by which those distortions might be corrected requires a careful survey of the forc-
es and beliefs that influence, reflect and create the citizenry’s state of mind.137  The metaphor of 
siege has become a significant way in which the demand by the citizenry for increased immigra-
tion enforcement is explained and characterized in legal, social and political argument; per Justice 
Scalia, Arizonans “feel themselves under siege.”  This section will unpack the siege metaphor to 
illustrate how citizens have come to know what they know about immigration.  In particular, I 
will show that the principle thing that citizens know about immigration is that it is disordered, or 
out of control; accordingly citizens feel the need to exercise control over immigration in an effort 
to compensate. 
Arizona’s brief to the Supreme Court in United States v. Arizona depicts a besieged land-
scape: “Arizona and its 370-mile border are a conduit for rampant illegal entries and cross-border 
smuggling to a degree unparalleled in any other State.  The public-safety and economic strains 
that this places on Arizona and its residents have created an emergency situation . . . .”138  Indeed, 
a swath of Arizona territory is subject to enough illicit border traffic that the federal government 
has seen fit to install road-side warnings adjacent to these areas, up to eighty miles inland from 
the border, that read: “Danger – Public Warning – Travel Not Recommended,” “Active Drug and 
Human Smuggling Area,” “Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles 
Traveling at High Rates of Speed.”139  These signs not only indicate the presence of a territorially 
delimited social phenomenon; they also help to produce it as a fixture of the mental landscape of 
Arizonans who drive by these areas or who hear of the signs or see reproductions of them through 
social channels or the media.  The federal origin of the signs also points to that superior govern-
ment’s inability or unwillingness to stem the phenomenon; the warning substitutes for a policy 
response that stops the traffic from occurring.  The signs are perfectly emblematic of Arizona’s 
contention that it had to act on behalf of its citizens in response to an indifferent federal power; 
they compose the democratic knowledge the Arizona legislature is seeking to vindicate. 
The warnings also point to social phenomena which, at least when taken to their concep-
tual extreme, have the ability to render a place weak and vulnerable; ills that, left unchecked, 
would result in decline or, in the language of siege, surrender.  “Armed criminals” sow fear and 
division and require police responses.140  Drug use, and the addiction it spawns, saps the citizenry 
of industry and strength, increases the cost of medical care, and breaks up families.  The illicit 
                                                                
 136 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
567, 591-96 (2008) (discussing state and local laws comparable to S.B. 1070 that have arisen in other jurisdictions); Su, 
supra note 42, at 34-36 (describing “state-mandated enforcement laws” such as S.B. 1070 and its corollaries in other 
states). 
 137 See Lessig, supra note 12, at 1008 (discussing mechanisms by which social constructions develop and 
might be altered). 
 138 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 139 Id. at 6 (quoting the text of JA 167-170, a photo of a warning sign that was presented as evidence in the 
case). 
 140 Id. 
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traffic also degrades, denudes and threatens the viability of the land itself: 
[p]rivate ranchers living near the border constantly face the epidemic of crime, 
safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems (including 
large deposits of trash and human waste, and cut water lines and fences) associ-
ated with a steady flow of illegal crossings on their land . . . . The illegal traffic 
and the hundreds of informal trails and roads associated with it also take their 
toll on the fragile desert habitat . . . .141 
Arizona, in its brief, quantified the damage caused by undocumented immigrants, noting: 
[The state] spends several hundred million dollars each year incarcerating crim-
inal aliens and providing education and healthcare to aliens unlawfully present 
in the State, with local governments spending many millions more.  The Arizo-
na Department of Corrections estimates that criminal aliens now make up more 
than 17% of Arizona’s prison population, and the Maricopa County Attorney’s 
Office, which serves the City of Phoenix, estimates that 21.8% of the felony de-
fendants in the County’s Superior Court are unlawfully present aliens. . . . .  Of 
Arizona’s total inhabitants, approximately 6%—an estimated 400,000 individu-
als—are aliens who are unlawfully present and not authorized to work.  None-
theless, more than half—230,000—work anyway.  They compose 7.4% of all 
Arizona workers and drive down wages for citizens and legal residents in nu-
merous job markets.142 
Undocumented people are siphoning scarce dollars—jobs, jail beds, wages—from the 
people of Arizona.  Arizonans are besieged, and undocumented people are the cause; that much 
Arizonans know. 
My point here is to present this view, and not to undermine its empirical truth by citation 
to contrary statistics, or contextual information, that is excluded from this set of facts.143  The pic-
ture painted in this opening brief reflects what Arizonans believe to be true about what undocu-
mented people are doing to the territory which Arizona citizens own, or that is, in one way or an-
other, under Arizona’s jurisdiction.  Arizonans “feel themselves under siege”144 and to the extent 
Arizonans feel this way, it is subjectively true; it is the lived reality of a significant proportion of 
Arizona’s citizens.145 
What Arizonans feel, it is important to note, does have some real empirical basis.  Arizo-
na has experienced a 351 percent increase in border crossings during the same period that overall 
                                                                
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 6-7. 
 143 See Posner, supra note 35 (summarizing this empirical viewpoint). See also JOHNSON, OPENING THE 
FLOODGATES, supra note 2, at 137-67. 
 144 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145 See Kahneman, supra note 71, at 144-45 (discussing the conflict between Cass Sunstein and Paul Slovic on 
how to react to the presence of systematic biases in the democratic will.  Sunstein seeks a counter-majoritarian corrective 
through the use of the administrative state.  Slovic argues that “widespread fears, even if they are unreasonable, should not 
be ignored by policy makers.”  Kahneman advocates a middle ground: “Psychology should inform the design of risk poli-
cies that combine the experts’ knowledge with the public’s emotions and intuitions.”). 
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border crossings were dropping.146  The dramatic shift was caused by the federal government’s 
decision to focus enforcement resources along the more populated San Diego corridor beginning 
in 1993.147  The increased surveillance was intended to move the flow of undocumented people to 
less-developed, more treacherous areas of the border region—including Arizona.  Operation 
Gatekeeper, as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) called it, was implemented with 
the goal of deterring entries along the entirety of the border by making passage more challenging. 
148  The deterrent effect did not materialize.149  Instead the policy resulted in a wealth transfer 
from migrants to smugglers as smuggling costs increased significantly.150  The number of crossers 
changed relatively little because the wage premium between the United States and its southern 
neighbors remained so large. The policy also notably increased the rate of border deaths.151 
But while Operation Gatekeeper was insignificant at a national level, it did not go unno-
ticed in Arizona.  And within the state, the change was most perceptible to those who lived closest 
to the border: “Before Operation Gatekeeper, the ranchers [living on the Arizona border] would 
see less than 50 border crossers a year coming individually or in twos or threes.”152  They were 
unperturbed by crossings at that rate; they were a fact of life at the border.  But as the new INS 
strategy took hold, ranchers began to see “around 100 or more people a day coming across their 
ranch[es].”153  “[N]arcotics traffickers also shifted their patterns because of border fortification in 
prioritized areas and would do ‘run-throughs,’ tearing across the ranch in vehicles, displaying an 
AK-47 to keep the ranchers quiescent.”154  The picture painted in Arizona’s brief is what ranchers 
on the border actually saw. 
The ranchers eventually responded with self-help by enlisting the members of a private 
immigration enforcement advocacy organization called the Minutemen, whose entreaties most 
ranchers rejected when the impact of migrant traffic was more modest.155  They changed their 
minds as traffic increased and the presence of the Minutemen patrolling their property appeared to 
reduce crossings on their land.156  Some of the ranchers also agreed to let the Minutemen build 
fencing along the Mexican border of their property.157  While the ranchers were most interested in 
the Minutemen’s willingness to build livestock fencing (Mexican cows are not inoculated against 
hoof and mouth disease), they also permitted them to build tall metal fencing that was purportedly 
designed to keep out flows of people.158 
Those who erected the fence were aware of the basic futility of these people fences, at 
least for preventing human flows overall.  The fences are short, and traffickers and migrants can 
                                                                
 146 See Mary Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in 
Border Regulation, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 701, 709 (2008). 
 147 See id. at 706-07. 
 148 See id. at 701, 707. 
 149 Id. at 707 (“[R]aising the costs and difficulty of border-crossing diverted rather than deterred.”). 
 150 See Massey Senate Hearing Testimony, supra note 111, at 26 (noting that a “massive increase in enforce-
ment . . . [and] militarization at the border increased the cost of border crossing from $600 to $2200”). 
 151 See Massey Senate Hearing Testimony, supra note 111, at 26. 
 152 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714. 
 153 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714. 
 154 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714. 
 155 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714 (extensively discussing 
the Minutemen organization). 
 156 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714. 
 157 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 715. 
 158 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 715. 
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easily divert their paths to enter another way.  Even so, the fence building continues in the face of 
its known futility, Mary Fan urges, because of its therapeutic function.159  As one Minuteman vol-
unteer put it in explaining the significance of fence building, “[a]t least we’re doing some-
thing.”160  Going further, he stated that: 
This isn’t a people fence. Right now we can’t stop the illegals but we can stop 
the cows . . . .  The fence symbolizes that citizens are doing something with this 
invasion, which is one, being the cows, and also slowing down the people inva-
sion.  It’s the most we can do with all the politics going on.161 
The fence the volunteer built will at least prevent border crossers from “cutting across [that par-
ticular] rancher’s backyard.”162 
The jump from the actions of individual citizens to those of local representative govern-
ments is not hard to make.  Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 is a futile but therapeutic response to a 
complex geopolitical phenomenon that mirrors the ineffectual individual gestures discussed 
above.  Like the volunteers building fences on the Arizona border, the legislators who passed the 
bill were “at least doing something” in response to the increased flow of migrants through the 
state.  It may be, as the United States pointed out in oral argument, that Arizona’s law will shift 
the migrant pathway to other States,163 redistributing the flow, rather than arresting it.  But the du-
ty of Arizona’s legislators is to solve local problems and, like the fence builders passing the buck 
to another property, moving undocumented migrants to another jurisdiction has some locally rec-
ognized ameliorative effect. 
The credit from constituents and the marginal prophylactic effects remains in place even 
after the Supreme Court struck down much of the law.  The portion of the law the Supreme Court 
left standing requires immigration checks in the course of lawful stops for other infractions.  If an 
infraction is located, then the Arizona authorities notify the federal government, which ultimately 
has to decide whether or not to deport the person.  By bringing the migrant to the federal govern-
ment’s attention, where she might not otherwise have been detected, Arizona does restructure the 
calculus of the federal government in favor of more deportations.164 
S.B. 1070’s on-the-ground effects are meaningful.  The most profound consequence of 
S.B. 1070 will likely be in the way it shapes the terms of the policy debate in Washington.165  But 
even that translation will not allay the fear and concern that drove the Arizona legislation.  Just as 
in the past, increased enforcement and harshness will translate into a feeling of greater insecurity.  
SB 1070 is a failure of legislation as therapy, quite apart from the failure of the legislative policy 
                                                                
 159 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 726 (describing in psycho-
analytic terms how taking futile actions functions as therapy). 
 160 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 717. 
 161 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 717. 
 162 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 717. 
 163 Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), availa-
ble at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-182.pdf. 
 164 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1851 (2011) (discussing how state and local law enforce-
ment, by bringing arrested noncitizens to the attention of federal immigration authorities, broaden the impact of federal 
removal actions). 
 165 See Su, supra note 42, at 60-61 (discussing how state measures like S.B. 1070 have impacted the national 
immigration policy debate). 
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when considered under the usual rubrics. 
The action by Arizona and the border denizens looks even more futile when we peek be-
hind the surface of their actions to look at the deeper motivation for building fences, or passing 
laws that seek “attrition through enforcement,” Arizona’s stated policy.166  Mary Fan’s psychoan-
alytic inquiry into the state of mind of Minutemen fence project participants exposed a deeper 
source of worry.  Middle class Americans feel themselves under siege by much more than people 
from the south, and that has surely only become more deeply felt and broadly distributed since the 
traumatic economic changes of the Great Recession.  As one Minuteman volunteer put it in 2007: 
I want my grandchildren to grow up and have a country to live in.  I had that 
privilege.  I’ve had a very nice life as a middle-class American.  My bills are 
paid, I take in a movie, go to dinner once in a while.  I don’t have a lot of needs.  
I want my grandchildren, my children, to have the same opportunities.  I already 
see it with my children, not having the same opportunities that I had after World 
War II.  As I grew up, we had nothing but opportunities.  We could do anything 
we wanted, we could go to any college we wanted.  We could get scholarships, 
we didn’t have to get Pell grants.  So I had all these opportunities.  And my 
children have to fight harder for these opportunities.167 
So she helps build a fence that she knows will not solve those problems, and will have 
only an imperceptible effect on her more immediate fear of border crossers.  Likewise Arizona, 
and the other states that have adopted local legislation168 are simultaneously addressing the real 
problem of aliens being present in the state without authorization, and at another level are signal-
ing that they will do what they can to protect a middle-class way of life when forces beyond the 
control of a single state—and even the whole nation—buffet or overcome existing social ar-
rangements and expectations.  Citizens reward politicians for acting in this way. 
At both the micro and macro political level, then, citizens seek concrete ways to appear 
to exercise control over encompassing social forces in the face of siege, broadly construed.  The 
trouble with this process in the immigration context is that exercising control at the macro level 
through increased state or federal enforcement ultimately magnifies the feeling of siege rather 
than ameliorates it; it is an unsuccessful coping mechanism.  As Massey and Pren taught, more 
immigration enforcement created demand for more immigration enforcement.  Channeling this 
desire for hands-on control in a productive way, however, may point the way forward.  This mi-
cro-level desire among the citizenry to “do something” might be an opportunity to engage the 
democratic will in new ways. 
IV. PRODUCING BETTER DEMOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE 
The effects of undocumented migration are most concrete in the borderlands described 
by Fan in her ethnographic account and evoked by Arizona in its opening brief.  The human detri-
tus, the AK-47s, the border patrol, the march of migrants, the bodies of those who never reached 
                                                                
 166 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 167 Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 723. See also Susan Fiske, 
ENVY UP, SCORN DOWN: HOW STATUS DIVIDES US 89 (2011) (“[F]eeling individually deprived . . . may alert a person to 
feeling collectively deprived . . . [and] this collective feeling leads to blaming out-groups.”). 
 168 See Rodriguez, supra note 136, at 591-96. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol16/iss1/4
MORALES FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2013  12:22 PM 
2013] IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIC WILL 83 
their destination—border residents experience the social phenomenon of migration in these tangi-
ble ways that are rightfully and ineluctably upsetting.  But as undocumented migrants move in-
land and interface with migrant networks they are integrated into the social fabric and whatever 
harms they may generate become more abstract.  Undocumented migrants, in the estimation of 
those building a case for their exclusion, compete for jobs, reduce wages, siphon public resources, 
and commit crimes.  But all of these social phenomena have multiple causes to which undocu-
mented migration is—at most—a partial, and usually a marginal, contributor. 
If we were in Judge Posner’s alternate universe and immigration policy tracked the em-
pirical view of undocumented people’s effects in the world outside the borderlands we would not 
have the exaggerated and demonizing public vision of the problem that we see implemented in the 
law.  If the legal response were empirically grounded we might, at a minimum, expect the popu-
lace to have the view of undocumented people that the Arizona ranchers had prior to the three-
fold increase in traffic on their property.  We can imagine, given their indifference to the occa-
sional migrant, that the ranchers in that period were comfortable with cyclical flows of migrants, 
realized they entered to work, and recognized the migrants’ movements as relatively benign prod-
ucts of broad social forces.169  The past for the Arizona ranchers is the present empirical truth of 
the relationship between undocumented people and nearly every citizen of Arizona and the United 
States.170  We need not accept that undocumented people are completely harmless to understand 
that the political response to their presence bears no reasonable relationship to migrants’ impact 
on the nation’s complex social ills.  Getting ordinary citizens to be comfortable in the kind of 
world that the ranchers once accepted, a world that tolerates small-scale sovereign trespasses, 
would be a significant intermediate step towards changing the direction of the immigration re-
gime.  A reasonable political discourse about immigration can proceed from that belief. 
A. The Political Representation of Migrants: An Alternative? 
My exhortation to work through democracy to build out the more generous immigration 
regime does not preclude reforms designed to provide for the political representation of migrants; 
the immigration jury example, for instance, provides a species of limited political representation 
for migrants by giving individual migrants a voice before citizen—sovereign—decision makers.  
And, as I have mentioned, the exclusion of migrants from voting is a structural feature of the im-
migration regime’s entrenchment; without political representation for migrants, politics cannot 
systematically account for migrants’ interests. 
The simplest structural correction for this political failure would be to allow formal rep-
resentation for aliens—legal and “illegal”—in the political process.  This would be a preferable 
alternative to devising and implementing mechanisms for prompting the existing citizenry to pro-
vide empirically accurate knowledge about migration for use in political debate.  Political repre-
sentation of aliens is the surest way to improve the quality of democratic knowledge about immi-
gration.  Moreover, the political representation of aliens is not opposed to democratic values; it 
emerges from them.  Arash Abizadeh has argued persuasively that some kind of representation of 
non-citizens (even those not present in the territory in question) in the decision-making process 
related to border regimes follows from the foundational democratic norm that coercive political 
authority—which presumably includes the drawing and enforcement of borders—is illegitimate 
                                                                
 169 See Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short, supra note 146, at 714-17. 
 170 See generally JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supra note 2 (cataloging the benefits and modest so-
cial costs to unlimited migration). 
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unless those subject to the border regime have a voice,171 along with the citizenry bounded by the 
border, in the discourse that produces the coercive regime.172 
Even accepting Abizadeh’s theoretical elaboration of alien political representation, and 
the more instrumental informational benefits I have described, we must confront the obvious prac-
tical problem with alien political representation.  Despite the historical fact that non-citizens used 
to be able to vote in the United States, “the denial to aliens of the right to vote . . . [is] a near uni-
versally accepted feature of even the most liberal democratic states today”—ours is no excep-
tion.173  Indeed, Abizadeh concedes the impracticability of implementing the representation norm 
in the world as it now stands;174 he means his argument to serve as “a standard for judging the ex-
tent to which any empirically existing demos and its political institutions fall short of full demo-
cratic legitimacy.”175 
Still, issues with implementation might be far more flummoxing than Abizadeh concedes 
because the coercion he describes is not confined to the borderlands.  The cosmopolitan political 
control that must be enacted if coercion at physical boundaries between nation-states is to be le-
gitimate is equally required of practices that regulate questions of citizenship, among others.176  
Whatever the theoretical merits of this view, control over membership, even more than control 
over physical borders, is central to the colloquial vision of the rights that attend domestic demo-
cratic control.  Asking existing democracies to share decision-making authority over physical 
border regimes is one thing, asking them to share the right to determine the criteria for member-
ship in the body politic is quite another.  It may be that this is what democracy requires when 
properly understood, but that understanding deviates so dramatically from the average citizen’s 
view of what democracy entails that it begs for an articulation of the institutions that could plausi-
bly persuade common citizens to eventually relinquish their parochial understanding.  That is, 
Abizadeh’s argument ultimately provides still more evidence that the relationship between immi-
gration reform and the democratic will ought to be a central object of analysis in the immigration 
reform literature.  The gulf he describes between normative requirements and empirical fact is so 
wide that creative intermediary institutions will have to be imagined if it is ever to be bridged. 
Additionally, Abizadeh’s articulation of how the representation of all those subject to a 
border regime follows from democratic first principles is useful because it shows how my basic 
insight that reformers out to think about how to work with democracy, rather than against it, can 
lead in more radical directions then the modest rationalization of democratic knowledge that my 
argument has thus far entertained.  Abizadeh’s argument also underscores that the implementation 
of a different and less antagonistic form of democratic engagement with immigration questions is 
a very preliminary step in righting the regime.  More and better democratic knowledge is an im-
portant and necessary predicate to changing the orientation of the immigration regime, but it will 
fall short of the grandest cosmopolitan aspirations until some significant power over decision-
making is conceded by those who currently possess it.  Democratic knowledge about immigration 
                                                                
 171 Abizadeh means “voice” in the strong sense of discursive power and political control. See Abizadeh, supra 
note 2, at 39. 
 172 Abizadeh, supra note 2, at 55-56. 
 173 BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 94. 
 174 See Abizadeh, supra note 2, at 56. 
 175 Abizadeh, supra note 2, at 56. 
 176 Abizadeh, supra note 2, at 38 (“Anyone who accepts a genuinely democratic theory of political legitimation 
domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control and close the state’s boundaries, 
whether boundaries in the civic sense (which regulate membership) or in the territorial sense (which regulate move-
ment).”). 
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can be improved, but it will never be perfect so long as migrants are denied that power.  After all, 
it is unchecked democratic power over migrants that created the democratic knowledge that S.B. 
1070 acted on, and that Justice Scalia gave voice to in his Arizona dissent.  It is naïve to think that 
knowledge and persuasion alone can overcome completely differentials in political power.  But, 
like other theorists of cosmopolitanism, Abizadeh has not concerned himself with showing us 
how to get from here to there—the question I urge immigration reformers to make central to their 
concerns. 
What follows is a discussion of existing political science literature that could provide 
productive tools for addressing the deficiencies that I have identified in prior sections and a dis-
cussion of more specific targets for improving democratic knowledge about immigration. 
B. Charting the New Immigration Reform 
My discussion of immigration reform has ranged, but a few themes unify the discussion 
and are worth setting out in summary form as I turn to offer guideposts to reformers as they think 
creatively about the future of immigration reform. 
The first theme is the problem of migrants’ rights.  Not only are migrants’ rights a chal-
lenge to vindicate because of structural problems and the idiosyncrasies of the United States’ par-
ticular legal and political culture, but the provision and creation of such rights or benefits in ways 
that are less than robustly democratic may feed long-standing resentments in the populace that 
may end up making the regime harsher in the long run. 
A second theme that emerges from this discussion is the extraordinarily constrained en-
vironment in which immigration reform must operate due to the structural features of the regime.  
This constriction suggests that reform scholars, in particular, should be thinking very carefully 
about identifying the best, most precisely-targeted mechanisms to build support for the creation of 
a normatively desirable immigration regime over time.  I identify the citizenry’s views about im-
migration as the force that is the most susceptible to creating the conditions for lasting change. 
A third important insight has to do with the social strata at which reform efforts are pre-
sented.  The usual aim is to persuade those with the most power—the Supreme Court, the Presi-
dent, Congressmen—but I urge that efforts should be aimed closer to the bottom of the democrat-
ic power-chain.  There are a few reasons for this.  First, the democratic knowledge that helps 
sustain the harsh immigration regime is in part the product of psychological anxiety among the 
populace that has to do with more than just immigration.  As we saw with the Minuteman volun-
teer who discussed her fears for the next generation of Americans, the entirety of many citizens’ 
social world appears in upheaval.  For this broad swath of the citizenry, grand discourse about 
immigration, like President Obama’s Rose Garden speech, will fall on deaf ears because it is so 
far removed from these concerned citizens’ lives.  Persuading high-level actors may produce 
some benefits for migrants, but it is unlikely to fundamentally change the character and direction 
of the regime.  Smaller-scale engagement is what is needed. 
The felicity of a lower level of engagement also emerges from Arizonans’ response to 
the migrant influx.  The citizens who built ineffective and symbolic fences at the border derived a 
therapeutic effect from those efforts, from the process of attempting to assert some control over 
what is viewed as a disordered social force overcoming the state.  Reformers may want to find 
productive ways to tap into that desire to assert control by channeling it into institutions—like the 
immigration jury example—that create conditions under which just results, or better democratic 
knowledge can emerge from the exercise. 
One might object that the Civil Rights movement’s success was in large part the result of 
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top-down efforts: counter-majoritarian decisions by the courts, the confluence of highly unusual, 
and arguably democratically deficient, circumstances that produced the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,177 and forceful presidential actions178 that ran counter to the majority interest, narrowly de-
fined.  Why not the same factors for migrants?  They are not citizens; and that, I argue, will make 
all the difference in how social change proceeds in the long run. 
The fourth theme suggests that the impulse to migrant’s rights should shift its emphasis.  
Abizadeh’s focus on the normative necessity of alien political representation clarifies what the 
ultimate procedural aspiration of immigration reform should be.  Clarifying such aspirations can 
help to keep reformers trained on the right goals as they seek to enact change in the highly con-
strained environment that exists in the United States today. 
Joseph Carens has urged scholars of immigration reform to follow an ethical practice: 
“whatever we say ought to be done about international migration should not be too far from what 
we think actually might happen [and from] what we think our community might do.”179  My ar-
gument has followed this suggestion, while pushing it away from the usual focus on substantive 
ends—amnesty, for instance—to procedural concerns that seek to reform the immigration regime 
through the creation of better democratic knowledge.180  I have also pressed on Carens’ point a bit 
to suggest that “what we think actually might happen” is too crabbed if we do not work to expand 
the universe of “what we think actually might happen.” Only by thoughtfully creating the condi-
tions to expand the possibilities of what can actually happen will the immigration regime begin to 
                                                                
 177 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 121, at 2-23, (Reviewing the unusual circumstances that led to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 178 I refer here to the history of affirmative action, which largely came into force through the actions of the 
Executive, such as with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Executive Order 11,246, which called for anti-discrimination poli-
cy for federal contractors. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965).  President Richard Nixon 
further pushed forward the Equal Employment provisions of Executive Order 11,246, issuing Executive Order 11,478 four 
years later. See Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Aug. 8, 1969) (calling for a policy of equal opportunitiy for 
federal employment, prohibiting “discrimination . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, or 
age,” and calling for “continuing affirmative action program [with]in each executive department and agency”). 
 179 Joseph Carens, Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration, 30 INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION REVIEW 156, 157-58 (1996) 
 180 One of the primary claims of deliberative democratic theory is that decisions produced through deliberative 
practices “are more legitimate because they respect the moral agency of the participants.  This benefit is inherent in the 
process . . . [and] is not appropriately subjected to empirical investigation.” Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic 
Theory and Empirical Political Science, ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 497, 498 (2008).  But the legitimating function of delib-
erative practices, particularly in the legal culture of the United States, discussed further infra, is also a reason for caution.  
If citizens merely rubber-stamp a regime that is unjust from an external point of view, then deliberative practice legitimiz-
es the immigration regime in the pejorative sense.  Deliberative practices are entitled to more legitimacy only to the extent 
they occur under ideal conditions, the scope of which are subject to some debate among theoretical practitioners.  One of 
those conditions, for instance, is equality.  “Background inequities in resources, status, and other forms of privilege upset 
the communicative equality that deliberation requires.” Archon Fung, Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Eth-
ics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World, 33 POL. THEORY 397, 398 (2005).  The immigration jury proposal I 
have outlined should go forward without anything resembling that level of equality because of the structural limitations I 
have described: in this arena the ideal is not possible.  This position is consistent with Fung’s ethical practice of delibera-
tive democracy because the institution is designed to create a space where deliberation can happen (in a political context 
where it generally does not) and because the exchange is designed to conform to just deliberative conditions as much as 
possible given current social facts.  See id. at 406-08.  Additionally, I am not advocating this institutional change as a sub-
stitute for social and political movements.  I see institutions providing sites that can enhance the efficacy of such organiz-
ing.  See id. at 408-11. 
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inch towards reformers’ ultimate goals. 
I conclude this piece by pointing scholars to the deliberative democracy literature, which 
provides a number of useful and under-explored tools for imagining ways to go about changing 
the direction of the immigration regime, and by setting out some specific targets for change. 
C. Deliberative Democracy: A Toolkit for the New Immigration Reform 
The deliberative democracy literature is skeptical of the legitimacy of law that is ground 
simply in the aggregation of the ex ante views of the citizenry.  Deliberative democrats are suspi-
cious of the usual republican democratic process for reasons evident in the gulf between citizens’ 
perceptions of undocumented migration and the empirical analysis of harms and benefits.  Delib-
erative democrats urge that legal and political legitimacy hinges on, among other things, subject-
ing political decision-making to objective reasoning.  The legislative entrenchment of the border 
enforcement approach—even in the face of its abject failure—described by Skrentny and Gell-
Redman is, in part, a symptom of the legislature’s failure to adopt legislation that conforms to rea-
son, in favor of distorted public opinion.  Similarly, Massey and Pren’s wish for a Congress that 
passes immigration legislation accounting for “the underlying dynamics and social processes in-
volved”181 is consonant with the kind of reason-based decision making that deliberative democrats 
favor.  The processes used to create “the democratic will,” deliberative democrats argue, has im-
portant effects on what the democratic will is; viewpoints are not process neutral.  Changing the 
process can change the outcome.  If the democratic process becomes more reason-based and de-
liberative, then outcomes may shift too.  The example of the immigration jury reflects these delib-
erative democratic convictions. 
Focusing on normative procedure rather than normative substance also addresses a flaw 
in the normative political and legal theory literature that is seldom remarked upon.  The procedur-
al or representational turn underscores the importance of aliens (subalterns in the coinage of post-
colonial theory) speaking for themselves.  While I am aware of the gross inequality that shapes to 
some degree the content and reception of migrant speech, the majority of scholars developing 
normative political and legal theory in this area are working and thinking, as I do, from positions 
of extreme economic, social, and intellectual privilege.  It behooves us from an ethical and epis-
temological point of view at least to be self-conscious of that fact, and to make it part of our crea-
tive endeavor to find ways to allow migrants to speak for themselves in the process of constituting 
norms that make claims to universality.182 
Engagement with the deliberative democracy literature should prove useful to immigra-
tion law scholars for reasons beyond its epistemic sophistication; it has also inspired a rich and 
varied set of institutional designs intended to make real its theoretical promise.183 
                                                                
 181 Massey & Pren, supra note 99, at 24. 
 182 Iris Marion Young makes a related point: “[T]he structure and norms of ideal deliberative democracy . . . 
provide the epistemic conditions for the collective knowledge of which proposals are most likely . . . to promote results 
that are wise and just [for a multicultural society].”  IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 30 (2000). 
 183 See, e.g., Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, 66 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 66, 66-
75 (2006) (describing appropriate ways public participation can be used to develop democracy); Archon Fung, Survey 
Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 338, 
339 (2003) (discussing the development of “minipublics,” which encourage more participation of the public in a democra-
cy); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 340 (2003) (analyzing the appropriate 
contexts for implementing a “deliberative democracy” or “discourse” theory-based approach, injecting “face-to-face” in-
teractions into political dialogue). 
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D. The New Immigration Reform: Targets for Change 
Below, I set out some prominent factors that skew democratic knowledge about immi-
gration in a way that helps that knowledge feed into other structural elements that keep the immi-
gration regime moving in a harsh direction.  Targeting these factors for intervention, potentially 
with deliberative democratic methods, should help begin to improve the quality of the democratic 
knowledge that immigration politics acts upon.  After cataloging these factors, I show how they 
are all addressed to some degree by the exemplary immigration jury reform I have discussed. 
1. Race and Otherness 
How does an American citizen residing in Phoenix perceive the fact of undocumented 
migration first-hand?  In Alabama or Georgia?  The primary identifier is race, closely followed by 
language, and then occupation.  Citizens may imagine the militarized crossings that ranchers on 
the border actually see, but they perceive “illegals” in their communities through the proxy of 
race.  The use of race or language in this way is problematic for reasons obvious and not.  For a 
country with a history of race-based labor regimes, tying race to unlawful work or unlawful pres-
ence poses dangers in the long term, in part because this association conditions citizens to think of 
entitlements—like the right to work—as functions of race.184  That kind of thinking can easily 
mutate into a trait that marks a race, creed, or national origin as unworthy more generally, and ir-
respective of legal status. 
The subtler problem with the social use of race as a proxy for undocumented migration is 
that the United States radically diversified the origins of authorized migrants in 1964 with the 
passage of the Hart-Celler Act.185  Undocumented migration from Mexico, Central America, and 
                                                                
 184 Fan describes this phenomenon in psychological terms: 
The salient feature of racial distinctiveness in minorities can contribute to distorted perceptions of 
correlation with negative traits such as criminality.  This formation of what is called in the social 
psychology literature an ‘illusory correlation’ is due to how distinctiveness and infrequency distort 
our judgment, leading us to link racially salient people with salient negative behaviors and overes-
timate the association because both are infrequently encountered and strikingly salient in their joint 
infrequency.  Illusory correlations in perception are aggravated by expectancy-based mechanisms 
and confirmation biases that render us resistant to data contrary to our stereotypes and selectively at-
tuned to belief-confirming information while discounting or discarding information that does not fit 
the view.  We are particularly susceptible to hostile misperception in times of social strain and na-
tional self-doubt like that precipitated by our present economic turmoil because, as social psycholo-
gists have posited, ‘ego threat’ to self-regard activates negative ethnic stereotypes to bolster self-
regard. 
Fan, Post-Racial Proxies, supra note 37, at 944. 
 A related cognitive model through which we might productively explain what is problematic about the work-
ings of these heuristic responses is that they prey upon Americans’ cultural-constituted bias to be “dispositionist,” that is to 
attribute behavior like unlawfully immigrating to an unchangeable reflection of a person’s low-moral worth, when in fact 
psychological research tells us that people’s behavior is more accurately viewed as a product of circumstances.  See Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Econom-
ics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 251-62 (2003).  Hanson & Yosifon also discuss how dispositionism as-
sisted Americans in relieving the cognitive dissonance of slavery in an America that claimed to value freedom, individual 
autonomy, and human rights. See id. 
 185 See NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 56, at 258-59. 
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other non-European countries grew precipitously during the same period as did authorized migra-
tion from Mexico and Central America.186  That is, since 1964, America has become dramatically 
more diverse by almost every measure.  Even so, citizens’ anxiety about social or cultural change 
in general is largely attributed to undocumented migration.187  Thus citizens feel themselves to be 
under siege by the significant increase in the racial, ethnic and linguistic diversity of all immi-
grants, legal and undocumented.188  But since the citizenry cannot tell who is legal or illegal simp-
ly by looking at him, individual observations are likely to give citizens an exaggerated sense of 
how many “illegals” there actually are.189  And this socially problematic ambiguity is mostly the 
result of legally authorized changes to the immigration regime. 
2. Social Distance 
Social science research has shown that developing personal or professional relationships 
with people who belong to disfavored social or racial groups lowers bias.190  These de-biasing in-
teractions seldom occur between citizens and undocumented migrants because undocumented mi-
grants keep their distance from citizens or are guarded about their legal status around strangers for 
self-protective reasons.  Even if citizens did get to know undocumented people in formal or in-
formal ways, language barriers would pose a significant obstacle to creating the kind of relation-
ship that would help individual citizens break through the exaggerated view of the “evils” that 
undocumented migrants visit upon the nation. 
3. Political Distance 
One of the instrumental reasons that democracy is a superior form of government is be-
cause citizens provide consistent feedback on the effects of laws, regulation, and governance in 
the real world.  Though large-scale republican democracy does pose obstacles to effective imple-
mentation of that feedback, these can sometimes be overcome.  John Hart Ely’s political process 
theory,191 for instance, sees courts as vehicles for ensuring that minority views get due considera-
tion in the political system. 
Immigration, alienage, and naturalization laws are different from other laws in an im-
portant way because those most affected by the laws have no formal control over their passage or 
implementation.192  One of the most important instrumental benefits of democracy then, is entirely 
absent from this area of law.  If few in the political debate know how these laws affect their tar-
gets, it should be no surprise that immigration law, or public views of immigration, do not square 
with empirical reality: there is no sufficient structural mechanism to keep immigration law 
                                                                
 186 See Massey & Pren, supra note 99, at 17-21. 
 187 See Jens Hainmueller & Daniel J. Hopkins, The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint 
Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants 1, 22, (MIT Pol. Sci. Dept., Working Paper No. 22, 2012), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2106116; Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 61. 
 188 The anxiety of demographic change became more visible in the aftermath of President Obama’s election to 
a second term.  See, e.g., Steven Hahn, Political Racism in the Age of Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at SR6 (dis-
cussing the white American’s unease with the increasingly successful claims of non-whites to political inclusion). 
 189 See Fan, Post-Racial Proxies, supra note 37, at 944. 
 190 See Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures, supra note 70, at 1064; Jerry Kang & Kristen Lane, Seeing Through 
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 501-03 (2010). 
 191 See ELY, supra note 72, at 103. 
 192 See discussion of Abizadeh, supra Part IV.A. 
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grounded. 
And the Supreme Court, as discussed above, cannot play the politically protective role it 
sometimes does with respect to disfavored discrete and insular minority citizens, at least to the 
same degree.  This is both because the Court has, of its own accord, ceded authority over immi-
gration largely to Congress,193 and because, as a result of the Court’s position in relation to the 
other political branches and the popular sovereign, it cannot exert the same degree of authority 
over the rights of migrants. 
4. The Criminal Taint 
Elsewhere I have written extensively about how and why immigration laws deploy the 
stigma of criminality and to what effect.194  It suffices here to acknowledge the entrenched social 
perception that undocumented migrants are categorical criminals.  Just as the basic stigma of be-
ing undocumented bleeds into other categories of noncitizens, so too does the criminality associ-
ated with undocumented migrants taint immigrants in general.  Placed in the context of the citi-
zenry’s unsympathetic disposition to citizen-criminals, it is not difficult to understand why 
amnesty for undocumented people is so challenging to achieve.  If “illegals” are perceived as 
criminals, then amnesty—particularly with a path to citizenship—is the admission of criminals 
into the body politic.195 
5. Work as a Property Right 
Prior to 1986 it was perfectly legal for an employer to hire an undocumented migrant, 
and being an undocumented worker posed no additional legal problem beyond whatever legal vio-
lations attended entry into the United States.196  Today it is unlawful for employers to hire undoc-
umented migrants and, for the migrants’ part, getting a job usually involves brandishing a citi-
zen’s social security number and some other false document.  These acts can, in turn, lead to 
severe criminal penalties under federal law.  This legal shift turned the workplace from: 
[a] location where immigrants, through sweat and toil “earned” their social right 
to remain present in the United States into the locus of criminal endeavor and 
fraud. Work went from a marker of belonging to a species of theft. Correspond-
ingly, the ability to work in the United States became [a] . . . property right be-
longing exclusively to citizens and legal aliens.197 
But the property analogy fits poorly with the commonplace understanding of property as 
an exclusive good—”buy land; they’re not making it any more.”198  Jobs are not usually zero-sum.  
                                                                
 193 See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 11, at 50. 
 194 See generally Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8 at 56 (discussing how the law uses the stigma 
of criminality and its attachment to certain races as a strategy to limit socially disfavored groups’ claims on social, eco-
nomic, and political resources). 
 195 See Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 72. 
 196 Prior to 1986 this was true at the federal level, though at the time, a number of states were already regulat-
ing the employment of undocumented migrants.  See Su, supra note 42, at 21. 
 197 Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8, at 65. 
 198 This popular saying is attributed to American author Mark Twain. See Douglas A. McIntyre, Memo to 
Congress: “Buy Land, They Ain’t Making Any More of It”, TIME, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business 
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Having more workers can boost demand for goods and services, thus creating more jobs.199 
6. The Bewildering World 
Every aspect of contemporary life is shifting at an accelerated pace; technology, social 
mores, economic possibility, and job requirements continue to change markedly and rapidly.  As 
compared to other developed nations, the American government insulates its citizens less from 
these disruptive forces, a failure that can lead to a socially and emotionally frayed populace.  In 
this general climate of upheaval, and without adequate insulation from the state, citizens simply 
have fewer resources—emotional, social, and cognitive—to devote to understanding the complex-
ity of undocumented migration.200 
These factors drive the gap between how citizens think about immigration and the con-
sensus empirical view.  Imagine, however, how these factors might be challenged if a jury of citi-
zens had to decide the fate of a long-standing “illegal” migrant without criminal convictions.  
Such an encounter would, to some degree, close the political distance between migrants and citi-
zens.  In such a proceeding, a migrant would address the citizen jury in a formal setting, recount 
their personal migration story, and ask the jury to find them worthy of becoming a formal member 
of the polity, despite having entered the country without permission.  That encounter would, in an 
imperfect way, be a political discussion about who should have the right to belong in the United 
States and allow the migrant to represent his own interests to members of the popular sovereign.  
The proceeding would bridge social distance, and the face-to-face encounter would at least 
acknowledge the shared humanity between migrant and citizen juror.  Stories the migrant tells 
about his life, both in the United States and prior to his entry, would create a kind of temporary, 
though obviously freighted, intimacy between the jury and the migrant.  While the differential of 
power between citizen juror and migrant could mitigate the positive effects of such an exchange, 
this hierarchical constraint can only be changed over an extended period of time.  The social ef-
fect may be marginal, but it remains important in this context precisely because such social mix-
ing is rare. 
Race, the criminal taint, and work as a property right, can also be challenged in this en-
counter.  Regarding race, citizen jurors will be giving individualized membership consideration to 
a migrant who runs, at least to some degree, counter to racial stereotypes.  The same line of rea-
soning extends to the criminal taint, as citizens will encounter migrants whose only significant 
unlawful act was the initial unlawful entry.  As for the conceptualization of work as a property 
right, a significant proportion of these migrants will have substantial work histories.  The oppor-
tunity for migrants to share stories of effortful contribution through work may not attack directly 
the idea that migrants steal jobs, but in the context of a larger narrative, may at least show that 
migrants work for the same reasons that citizens do: to provide a fulfilling life for themselves and 
their families.  This might to some degree erode the commonplace view that jobs are zero-sum. 
The immigration jury is just one example of the kinds of reforms that can help address, 
from the bottom up, some of the issues identified in this article.  Surely, however, there are many 
other reforms that can have similar effects. 
                                                                
/article/0,8599,1874407,00.html. 
 199 See Posner, supra note 35. 
 200 See generally Myron Rothbart & Oliver P. John, Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change: A Social 
Cognitive Analysis and Some Longitudinal Findings, in PREJUDICE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 32 (Paul 
Sniderman et al. eds., 1994). 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE RESERVOIR OF COSMOPOLITAN SENTIMENT 
I conclude by providing some of the reasons to believe that changing the underlying 
character of the harsh immigration regime is possible.  While getting to that end point requires the 
creation of a cosmopolitan moral ethic in the citizenry, the United States is in a unique position to 
achieve this ethic given its history and values.  Our culture has already accepted certain tropes 
that are widely invoked by the polity and can be readily drawn upon.  The most frequently cited 
examples include statements characterizing America as a “melting pot” and a “nation of immi-
grants.”201  Further, recent quantitative empirical work has shown that beneath the bluster, Ameri-
cans favor the immigration of people perceived as contributing to American society by work-
ing,202 and that trouble arises because undocumented people are perceived as non-contributors 
because they entered without permission.203  Additionally, rather than take a racial-cultural ap-
proach to the concept of citizenship, the United States takes a radically Lockean and contractual 
view.204  This is not to say that race plays no part in the polity’s thinking about migration.  To the 
contrary, racial issues have historically played a substantial role in structuring and creating de-
mand for immigration restrictions,205 and that trend continues to today.206  Yet, notwithstanding 
these restrictions, the United States is now, nonetheless, a very diverse nation.  And norms have 
shifted such that it falls well outside mainstream social mores to explicitly invoke race as a justifi-
cation for exclusion. 
The upshot to these structural qualities of American nationhood suggests that we have 
the potential to become much more cosmopolitan than peer countries.  The country is more fertile 
soil for cultural and democratic change than countries like Sweden, Austria, or Ireland, which cur-
rently have larger foreign-born populations as a percentage of total population than the United 
States.207  This suggests that if the structural entrenchment described above can be turned around, 
the United States citizenry could be willing to absorb more immigrants.  Further, over time, the 
United States may be able to reach a position where it could accept the free movement of persons 
through its borders with minimal restrictions. 
This last point follows from the contractual character208 of our national ties: the law 
structures our sense of nationhood.  As a result, laws affecting aliens have a profound impact on 
how Americans conceive of themselves as a people.  In their text, their exercise, and their contes-
tation, immigration laws tell a story about whom United States citizens are or wish to be.  The 
                                                                
 201 See Schahar, Earned Citizenship, supra note 80, at 111, 135 (illustrating the use of these terms). 
 202 See Hainmueller & Hopkins, supra note 187, at 22 (“Immigrants who are positioned to be more successful 
in the U.S. labor market or to make contributions to the country’s well-being are viewed more positively, while those who 
do not speak English, do not plan to work, or have entered without authorization are viewed negatively.”). 
 203 Id. 
 204 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE 
AMERICAN POLITY 26 (1985) (discussing Locke’s concept of civic governance that requires the consent of citizens, and its 
treatment of illegal aliens). 
 205 See generally NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 56, at 21-55 (tracing the origins and history of the 
“illegal alien” in American law and society). 
 206 See generally Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow, supra note 8 (discussing how the negative racialization of 
socially disfavored minorities, especially with regards to Latino and Mexican persons, influences immigration policy). 
 207 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD 
SOCIAL INDICATORS 46-47 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/berlin/47570020.pdf. 
 208 See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 204 (discussing the contractual character of American citizen-
ship). 
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laws, in an important sense, define us,209 and this centrality of law in American self-definition can 
be a source of hope for the rational regime.  It means identity definitions are relatively plastic, and 
may be changed or rationalized through legal, rather than purely social, channels. 
All of these characteristics should buoy reformers to carefully chart a new course for 
immigration reform while keeping their ultimate aspirations in sight. 
 
                                                                
 209 This function can be appreciated most readily by acknowledging that until the 1964 Hart-Celler Act, which 
equalized global quotas for immigrants, managing the racial composition of the immigration pool to favor white northern 
Europeans over less desirable groups was the direct goal of immigration regulation.  The seminal cases of constitutional 
immigration and alien law all involved, to one degree or another, the issue of socially undesirable ethnicity. See Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 50, at 256-58 (document-
ing these seminal cases). 
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